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INTRODUCTION
In September 2000, California police arrested Paul Eugene
Robinson and charged him with committing a series of sexual assaults
1
in Sacramento in 1994. Despite the horrific nature of the crimes
2
alleged, the arrest unsettled civil libertarians because it marked the
first time police officers arrested a person based solely on the
3
suspect’s genetic profile, rather than a name. At the time of the
indictment, the police had not determined the accused individual’s
4
name and instead resigned themselves to seeking a “John Doe”
5
warrant. In Robinson’s case, the prosecutor filed charges only one
1. See Erin Hallissy & Charlie Goodyear, Databank Match Brings Arrest on DNA
Warrant, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 25, 2000, at A3 (explaining the legal genesis of Robinson’s
case).
2. See Audrey Cooper, Man Identified Only By DNA Arrested, AP ONLINE, Oct. 25,
2000, available at 2000 WL 28615507 (reiterating that prior to Robinson’s arrest,
police officers called the suspect the Second Story Rapist “for his penchant of
attacking women” on the second floor of their residences).
3. See id. (reporting that civil liberties advocates are concerned that the process
of issuing “John Doe” arrest warrants might adversely affect suspects’ abilities to
defend themselves). For a further description of so-called “John Doe” indictments
and warrants, see infra note 5.
4. See Richard Willing, Police Expand DNA Use, USA TODAY, Oct. 25, 2000, at 1A
(noting that California is one of at least six states that has filed charges against
unidentified suspects using DNA evidence); County Charging Unknown Man with Rape
on DNA Evidence, AP NEWSWIRES, Feb. 14, 2000 [hereinafter Unknown Man] (quoting a
California Deputy District Attorney, who filed similar DNA indictments prior to
Robinson’s arrest, as saying, “[w]hy should some victim not get what they [sic]
deserve, just because we don’t have a name?”).
5. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 840 (7th ed. 1999) (“John Doe” is a “fictitious
name used in a legal proceeding to designate a person whose identity is
unknown . . . .”). A “John Doe” indictment or warrant, therefore, charges the legal
entity of a person with the commission of a crime, but describes the defendant
through other means, e.g. a genetic profile, rather than listing the suspect’s name.
Cf. id. at 1450 (defining “John Doe Summons” as a “summons to a person whose
name is unknown at the time of service.”). See also Bill Dedman, Only DNA Identifies
Suspect in Rapes, OREGONIAN, Oct. 10, 1999, at A8 (suggesting the process of indicting
DNA is novel because prosecutors usually employ “John Doe” warrants “when the
accused is known by an alias or by a physical description”). A DNA indictment
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6

day before the statute of limitations would have barred any
7
prosecution for the 1994 sexual assaults. In a case that likely will
8
have a substantial impact on criminal procedure, the prosecutor in
Robinson’s case sparked a debate over the constitutionality of
indicting suspects’ genetic material to avoid the restrictions imposed
9
on prosecutors by statutes of limitations.
10
Although Robinson’s case marks the first time the police have
arrested an unnamed and unknown suspect based only on a
11
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) description, prosecutors in at least
nine states have filed charges against or indicted “John Doe” suspects
simply replaces a physical description with a genetic description. See Charges Identify
Rapist Only By His DNA, AP NEWSWIRES, Sept. 3, 1999 [hereinafter Charges]
(describing a DNA-based warrant used in Milwaukee that identified the suspect as
“John Doe, unknown male,” with matching DNA at “genetic locations D1S7, D2S44,
D5S110, D10S28 and D17S79”).
Many state codes specifically provide for the use of “John Doe” warrants and
indictments. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 815 (West 1985) (“A warrant of arrest shall
specify the name of the defendant or, if it is unknown to the magistrate . . . the
defendant may be designated therein by any name.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 277, § 19
(1992) (“If the name of an accused person is unknown to the grand jury, he may be
described by a fictitious name or by any other practicable description . . . . An
indictment of the defendant by a fictitious or erroneous name shall not be grounds
for abatement . . . .”).
6. See David Kravets, DNA Sidesteps Limitations Statute, AP ONLINE, Jan. 6, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 3649888 (indicating the filing of charges precluded the statute
of limitations from taking effect, thereby allowing Robinson’s arrest after the
statutory deadline).
7. See Willing, supra note 4, at 1A (revealing the prosecutor’s reasoning that
state law allows DNA-based warrants because the law allows warrants based on more
general physical descriptions of suspects).
8. See id. (noting that experts believe Robinson’s case will make “legal history”);
see also Kravets, supra note 6 (suggesting Robinson’s case might reach the U.S. States
Supreme Court); Erin Hallissy, DNA-Based Warrant Faces Appellate Review, S.F. CHRON.,
Apr. 6, 2001, at A3 [hereinafter Appellate Review] (“Robinson’s case could end up in
the U.S. Supreme Court . . . .”).
9. See Cooper, supra note 2 (noting that Robinson’s case marks the “flash point”
in the debate between civil libertarians and law enforcement agencies).
10. On January 5, 2001, Robinson’s attorney moved to dismiss the case against
his client based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the applicable statute
of limitations expired before police arrested Robinson. See E-mail from Mr. Johnny
C. Griffin III, Robinson’s attorney, to author (Nov. 27, 2000) (hard copy on file with
the American University Law Review). On February 23, 2001, a California Superior
Court judge rejected Robinson’s motion to dismiss the charges and upheld the arrest
warrant as valid. See Erin Hallissy, Judge Upholds Use of DNA Warrants, S.F. CHRON.,
Feb. 24, 2001, at A1 (indicating that experts believe this ruling represents the first
time a court has considered the validity of a warrant identifying an individual
exclusively by genetic data). On April 25, 2001, the California state Court of Appeals
issued a stay in Robinson’s case until it reviews briefs and decides on the
constitutionality of Robinson’s arrest warrant. See Appellate Review, supra note 8, at A3
(recognizing the possibility that Robinson’s case could ultimately compel the U.S.
Supreme Court to “set a national precedent on whether it is legal to use DNA
warrants to get around statutes of limitations”).
11. See Willing, supra note 4, at 1A (stating the charges prosecutors filed against
Robinson originally identified him “only by his DNA profile”).
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by relying exclusively on the suspects’ genetic make-up.
The
practice of charging or indicting DNA evidence in lieu of charging an
identity—hereinafter referred to as “DNA indictment”—originated in
13
Kansas.
There, in 1991, McPherson County Assistant District
Attorney Ty Kaufman indicted a DNA profile of a man who
14
committed several rapes, but police never caught him.
Theoretically, the indictment remains in effect until investigators
15
identify the perpetrator of the rape, notwithstanding a five-year
16
statute of limitations in Kansas for rape.
Prosecutors did not repeat the practice of DNA indictment until
17
1999. On September 1, 1999, Milwaukee County Assistant District
Attorney Norman Gahn used a DNA indictment to preserve sexual
assault and kidnapping charges for a case in which the statute of
18
limitations threatened to preclude further prosecution. At the time
12. See id. (indicating that California prosecutors “have charged a man with rape
using a warrant that identified him only by his DNA profile”); Julian E. Barnes, East
Side Rapist, Known Solely by DNA, Is Indicted, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2000, at B1
(describing the indictment of an unidentified rapist in Manhattan relying on DNA
evidence); Charges, supra note 5 (describing a 1991 Kansas case in which the
prosecutor used DNA to “establish an unnamed defendant”); DNA Profile is Used as
Basis for Arrest Warrant in Sexual Assault Case, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 5, 1999,
at C2 (stating that an arrest warrant was filed in Illinois against a suspect in a sexual
assault case); Greg Kennedy, Prosecutors File Charges Against DNA Profile in OU Student’s
Murder, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 21, 2000, at 1A (noting that charges were filed
against DNA evidence in an Oklahoma murder case); Pennsylvania State U.: DNA
Leads to Warrant for Man’s Arrest in Alleged Rape of Former Penn State Student, U-WIRE,
Mar. 30, 2000, available at 2000 WL 17590335 (discussing a Pennsylvania case in
which a warrant was issued for the arrest of unknown man whose DNA matched the
DNA evidence in a rape case); Lisa Sink & Linda Spice, Use of DNA Evidence Expands,
MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Oct. 26, 2000, at 1B (reporting a Wisconsin prosecutor
filed an arrest warrant against DNA); Brady Snyder & Amy Joi Bryson, Charge Filed
Against DNA, DESERET NEWS, Mar. 3, 2000, at A1 (referring to two Utah criminal cases
in which charges have been filed against DNA evidence); Unknown Man Indicted in
Austin Rape Case, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 5, 2000, at 45, available at WL 24523884
[hereinafter Austin Rape] (noting that a grand jury indicted an unknown man for a
1995 rape case when genetic material constituted the only evidence); Williston Junior
High School Vandalized, AP NEWSWIRE, Apr. 23, 2000 (identifying a North Dakota rape
case in which a prosecutor intended to use DNA evidence to obtain an indictment
despite the fact he did not have a suspect).
13. See Charges, supra note 5 (stating that Milwaukee County Assistant District
Attorney Norman Gahn was not the first prosecutor to file charges based solely on
DNA).
14. See id. (indicating that Kaufman filed charges against the DNA material out of
desperation because he did not possess any other leads in the case and the statutory
deadline for prosecution was quickly approaching).
15. See id. (quoting Kaufman as indicating the cases remain open because “we
haven’t found him yet”).
16. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3106(4) (1995) (“[A] prosecution for rape . . . must
be commenced within five years after its commission.”).
17. See Serial Rapist Indicted on Long Island Based Solely on DNA Evidence, AP
NEWSWIRES, Aug. 9, 2000 (noting that prosecutors initiated DNA indictment in 1991,
but “it was not until 1999 . . . that other jurisdictions began to follow suit”).
18. See David Doege, Novel Warrant IDs Suspect Only by DNA Databank Evidence Used
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he filed the charges, Gahn promised additional DNA indictments
19
would be forthcoming.
Gahn lived up to his promise and by
December 1999, he had used DNA indictments to obtain arrest
20
warrants against two more suspects accused of sexual crimes. The
repeated invocation of the DNA indictment process by Gahn, a
21
nationally recognized expert in DNA evidence, inspired other states
22
to employ the same procedure.
Prosecutors like Gahn have stated explicitly that by seeking DNA
indictments against “John Doe” defendants, rather than waiting and
filing charges against suspects known by name, they intend to prevent
the relevant statutes of limitations from barring prosecution when
23
and if investigators later identify the suspects.
Although this
approach is certainly a novel application of scientific and legal
24
principles, the process of charging genetic material without
identifying the suspect raises significant legal questions about
whether DNA indictments adversely affect a defendant’s chances of
25
receiving a fair trial.
DNA indictments trigger further concerns about defendants’ rights
26
upon considering the novelty of DNA evidence and its potential for
to Charge ‘John Doe’ in Rape, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Sept. 2, 1999, at 1A (stating that
authorities filed the charges before they “bump[ed] up against the time limit” for
bringing a criminal case, based on the relevant statute of limitations).
19. See id. at 12A (quoting Gahn as saying, “[w]e’ve got several more cases like
this that have been identified, and we will be filing them.”).
20. See David Doege, Prosecutor Uses DNA to Issue Warrant for Another Rapist,
MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Dec. 10, 1999, at 7 (noting that in addition to the three
DNA indictments already filed, Gahn planned to pursue at least three more DNA
indictments against suspected rapists within several weeks to preserve the state’s
jurisdiction over the cases).
21. See Doege, supra note 18, at 12A (noting that Gahn’s actions and reputation
as a recognized expert have enhanced Wisconsin’s reputation as a pioneer in the use
of DNA evidence to resolve criminal cases).
22. See sources cited supra note 12 (listing states that have pursued charges
against DNA material from crime scenes, all of which employed this procedure
following Norman Gahn’s revival of DNA indictments in 1999).
23. See David Doege, Arrest Sought for Assailant Known Only by Gene Profile,
MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Nov. 11, 1999, at 1 (“Gahn contends he has beaten the
statute of limitations clock.”); Rape Suspect Charged Only by DNA Code, CINCINNATI
POST, Oct. 8, 1999, at 9A (quoting Gahn as explaining, “[t]his way, it’s been put into
the system so we will preserve jurisdiction”); Dedman, supra note 5, at A8 (“The
prosecutor’s strategy [in using a DNA indictment] is an effort to keep the six year
time limit for bringing charges from running out.”).
24. See Doege, supra note 18, at 12A (quoting Marquette University Law School
Professor Daniel D. Blinka in describing Gahn’s DNA indictments as “extraordinary,”
and Ray Dall’Ostro, the chairman of the Wisconsin Bar Association’s criminal law
section, calling the cases “creative”).
25. See id. (according to Professor Blinka, “This [practice of DNA indictment] is
going to raise some interesting, thick legal issues down the road”).
26. See infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text (indicating that fingerprinting
dates back thousands of years); KEITH INMAN & NORAH RUDIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO
FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS 21 (1997) (finding scientists did not perform DNA testing in
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27

inaccuracy relative to fingerprint evidence. Because prosecutors
28
generally do not file “fingerprint indictments,” the practice of
indicting evidence of inferior accuracy, i.e., DNA, at least suggests the
possibility of misguided prosecutions. Additionally, the nature of
DNA indictments reflects the probability that prosecutors will arrest
and charge defendants many years removed from the commission of
29
the alleged crime,
potentially in violation of defendants’
30
constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the scientific and
technological procedures that allow investigators to identify suspects
on the basis of their genetic profiles. Part II discusses the evolution
of statutes of limitations, including the purposes and policies giving
31
rise to legislative limitations. Part II also examines the practice of
DNA indictment against this historical background, concluding that
DNA indictment does not comport with the reasons asserted for the
existence of these legislative enactments. Part III provides an analysis
of the use of fingerprints in criminal investigations. Part III then
explores whether DNA evidence is sufficiently superior to
fingerprinting to justify “John Doe” indictments, comparing and
contrasting the use of fingerprints to that of DNA evidence in
criminal trials. Part IV of this Comment provides a brief primer on
the history of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial,
the United States until 1986).
27. The scientific community uniformly regards fingerprint evidence as more
accurate and capable of producing conclusive identifications than DNA evidence.
See infra notes 173-74 (comparing the scientific accuracy of these two methods of
identifying suspects in criminal investigations).
28. An official with the National District Attorneys’ Association has never heard
discussion about the idea of indicting fingerprints nor seen any type of media
coverage addressing the concept. Telephone Interview with James Polley, Director
of Government Affairs, National District Attorneys’ Association (July 24, 2001).
Similarly, a veteran state prosecutor for over 23 years is not aware of any jurisdiction
that has taken steps to indict fingerprint evidence in the same way that prosecutors
have done with DNA evidence. Telephone Interview with Ara Crowe, Executive
Director of the Maryland State’s Attorneys’ Association, and state prosecutor for over
23 years (July 24, 2001).
29. For example, the prosecutors in the Paul Robinson case arrested the
defendant after the statute of limitations expired, more than five years after the
victim reported the crime. See Kravets, supra note 6 (providing the facts leading to
Robinson’s arrest).
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .”).
31. Statutes of limitations are also known as “limiting actions,” and the terms will
be used interchangeably throughout this paper. Accord Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J.
Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of the Statutes of Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453, 454-55
(1997) (“The law of limitation of actions is the set of legislatively and judicially
created legal rules—including the classification of claims, the duration of limitation
periods, the applicable principles of accrual and tolling, and the like—that
determine whether a claim is time-barred.”).
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questioning the constitutionality of DNA indictment against the
32
backdrop of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the right. Part
IV argues prosecutors’ use of this practice raises serious, and perhaps
constitutionally fatal, questions about DNA indictments’ legitimacy.
Part V concludes by providing recommendations to ensure the
protection of criminal defendants’ constitutional and statutory rights
in the event the courts uphold the validity of DNA indictments.
I.

THE FORENSIC USE OF DNA: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF DNA’S
USE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

A brief guide to some of the technical and scientific prerequisites
surrounding DNA analysis will prove helpful in providing a legal
analysis to DNA indictment. Initially, a rapist or perpetrator of a
33
sexual crime must leave behind—generally at the crime scene—a
sample of DNA that a trained technician will be able to recover and
34
This requirement does not present a high
ultimately analyze.
hurdle as, inevitably, virtually all perpetrators of sexual crimes leave
35
behind DNA samples. Because DNA resides in virtually every cell in
36
the body, the biological sample left by the sexual offender can be in
37
the form of hair, skin, blood, urine, or saliva, i.e., it need not be in
32. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
33. This Comment concentrates on the use of DNA indictments to assist in
identifying and prosecuting perpetrators of sexual crimes, especially rape. The
reasons for this narrow focus are three-fold: (1) Thus far, prosecutors have used the
vast majority of DNA indictments to pursue cases against defendants accused of
committing sexual crimes. See sources cited supra note 12 (listing cases, many of
which involve rape and incest, in a number of states where prosecutors have sought
DNA indictments); (2) Prosecutors most often use DNA evidence in sexual assault
and murder cases. See Paul E. Tracy, Ph.D. & Vincent Morgan, Big Brother and His
Science Kit: DNA Databases for the 21st Century, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635, 657
(2000) (noting that DNA evidence usually is limited to sexual offenses and murder
cases). Murder generally is not subject to a statute of limitations. See infra note 72
(listing crimes historically exempted from statutes of limitations); and (3) This line
of demarcation drawn by prosecutors using DNA indictment allows an appropriate,
albeit arbitrary, means of limiting the scope of this Comment. This author
recognizes, however, the potential application of DNA indictments to additional
criminal offenses.
34. See Tracy & Morgan, supra note 33, at 649 (stating that DNA’s use for crimefighting purposes depends on three premises: (1) the criminal must leave DNA
evidence behind at the crime scene; (2) a trained technician must specifically
perform a search for the DNA evidence; and (3) the evidence recovered must be
“found, collected, and be of sufficient quantity and quality to permit DNA testing”).
35. See Jonathan W. Diehl, Note, Drafting a Fair DNA Exception to the Statute of
Limitations in Sexual Assault Cases, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 431, 432 (1999) (noting that
rapists are distinguishable from other categories of criminals in that they “almost
always leave behind identifiable biological evidence”).
36. See Jennifer Sue Deck, Note, Prelude to a Miss: A Cautionary Note Against
Expanding DNA Databanks in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 20 VT. L. REV. 1057, 1062
(1996) (stating that DNA appears in all human cells containing a nucleus).
37. See Tracy & Morgan, supra note 33, at 639 (indicating that cells containing
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the form of sperm. Whether a proper search for the DNA takes
39
place, however, is an entirely different question.
Assuming DNA is collected, a DNA indictment presumes the
biological sample recovered from the crime scene ultimately will
match the sample of a person with a known identity, thereby
40
revealing the identity of the assailant. To give effect to DNA typing,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) initiated a pilot project in
41
Law
1990 called the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS).
enforcement officials gather and enter DNA samples into the CODIS
42
database and its progeny, pursuant to a legislative mandate, after
43
courts convict defendants for violating specified statutes.
These
software-based database systems allow law enforcement officials to
compare a DNA sample, regardless of whether the identity of the
44
sample is known, with every sample entered in the database. An
nuclei are found “in all bodily fluids, tissue, and hair”).
38. Although it is certainly possible for a female to commit a sexual offense, the
focus of this Comment is on sexual crimes committed by males against females. The
concentration on male-against-female offenses is in recognition of the fact that
“[t]he majority of sex offenders are male, while the majority of reported victims are
female.” Jessica E. Mindlin, Comment, Child Sexual Abuse and Criminal Statutes of
Limitation: A Model for Reform, 65 WASH. L. REV. 189, 193 (1990).
39. See Tracy & Morgan, supra note 33, at 654-55 (arguing that the scarcity of
resources available to most law enforcement agencies severely limits DNA’s use as a
crime-fighting tool).
40. See Christopher H. Asplen, Integrating DNA Technology into the Criminal Justice
System, 83 JUDICATURE J. 144, 146 (1999) (intimating that DNA typing is relatively
useful to the extent that there is an identified sample that can be matched against an
unidentified assailant’s DNA).
41. See Tracy & Morgan, supra note 33, at 640 (noting that the Department of
Justice, acting through the FBI, has taken advantage of the research and funding
resources available through the National Institute of Justice to take the lead role in
using DNA technology as a law enforcement tool). In 1994, Congress approved the
project by providing legislative authorization for the FBI to create a criminal DNA
databank in the DNA Identification Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (1995). See generally
George Bundy Smith & Janet A. Gordon, The Admission of DNA Evidence in State and
Federal Courts, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2465, 2472 (1997) (delineating the three steps
required to make statistical analysis of DNA typing useful: (1) comparison of a known
sample against an unknown sample; (2) calculation of the probability of a random
match between the two samples to establish the statistical significance of a match if
found; and (3) determination of the probability of such a match with respect to the
general population).
42. See, e.g., Tracy & Morgan, supra note 33, at 640-41 (discussing the Federal
Convicted Offender DNA Database as another example of the FBI’s leading role in
developing DNA initiatives).
43. See id. (explaining that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 requires incarcerated federal felons convicted of sexually violent offenses to
provide DNA samples to the databanks as a condition of their release from prison).
As of 1998, the CODIS system contained approximately 250,000 known samples from
offenders convicted of the statutorily prescribed crimes. See Press Release, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, The National DNA Index System (Oct. 13, 1998), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel98.htm (last visited June 18, 2001).
44. See Tracy & Morgan, supra note 33, at 642-85 (detailing the value of the
database system). The hope is that the database comparison will lead to a “cold hit”
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unstated premise behind the database regime, of course, recognizes
that people who commit certain statutorily prescribed crimes will re45
offend.
DNA is the chemical substance, located in virtually every human
46
47
cell, that carries an individual’s genetic code. In 1984, a scientist
developed a method of using DNA as an effective means of personal
48
identification, naming the process “DNA fingerprinting.”
The
methodology of DNA fingerprinting originally employed a process
49
known as Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) but
has since also used another process named Polymerase Chain
50
Although PCR analysis offers the benefit of
Reaction (PCR).
producing potentially conclusive results from a DNA sample of
between a sample of unknown origin and a sample from a person whose identity is
known to law enforcement authorities. See id. at 644 n.40 (defining a “cold hit” as a
situation when the source of a sample recovered from a crime scene matches with a
sample of known origin in the database, thereby revealing the identity of a potential
suspect).
45. See David Doege, Felons’ DNA Collection to Begin, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL,
Nov. 15, 2000, at 1B [hereinafter Doege, Felons’] (recognizing that felons are often
responsible for recidivistic crimes); Francie Latour, Revisited Rapes, Reawakened
Trauma, BOSTON GLOBE, May 28, 2000, at B1 (declaring the “time-tested knowledge
that rapists, like other violent criminals, tend to be repeat offenders.”); NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 119-20 (1992)
[hereinafter NRC I] (listing recidivism statistics for prisoners released in 1983, which
revealed that 36.4% of rapists and 32.6% of other sexual offenders were re-convicted
within three years of their release). The NRC I report also found that a DNA profile
databank focusing on sexual offenders, exclusive of other types of criminals, would
be the most cost-efficient means of cataloguing DNA because of the high rate of
recidivism for rapists. See id.
46. See Smith & Gordon, supra note 41, at 2465 (declaring that DNA “is found in
every cell of the human body, except red blood cells”).
47. See NRC I, supra note 45, at 2 (“DNA, the active substance of genes, carries
the coded messages of heredity in every living thing.”).
48. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 26, at 19 (explaining that the scientist, Alec
Jeffreys, discovered the application of DNA technology to the science of personal
identification while otherwise searching for genetic disease markers in DNA).
Although scientists have drawn legitimate distinctions between the terms “DNA
fingerprinting,” “DNA typing” and “DNA profiling,” this Comment uses the terms
interchangeably to refer to the process of using DNA evidence and technology to
identify a person’s identity. See id. (recognizing that scientists prefer the terms “DNA
typing” or “DNA profiling” because they are more descriptive); see also NRC I, supra
note 45, at 27-31 (distinguishing DNA fingerprinting, which refers to the process of
testing multiple sites of a gene, from DNA typing, which tests only one site of a
particular gene). DNA typing generally is preferred in the United States because the
test results are easier to analyze, while English scientists prefer DNA fingerprinting.
See id. at 28.
49. See Smith & Gordon, supra note 41, at 2468 (noting that RFLP analysis is the
primary technique for developing DNA evidence). For a simplified explanation of
the six scientific steps composing RFLP analysis, see id. at 2469-70.
50. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 26, at 19 (noting that Kary Mullis received a
portion of the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 1986 for developing PCR analysis). See
generally id. at 37-55 (providing a scientific explanation of how these two processes
operate to analyze a DNA sample, which can lead to an inference about the source’s
identity).
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51

limited quality and quantity, the RFLP analysis is more powerful in
discriminating between samples and thus more reliable in accurately
52
identifying a sample’s source. Together, RFLP and PCR analysis
provide the underlying framework for the identification of criminal
53
suspects based on their DNA.
The use of DNA evidence in criminal investigations has emerged as
one of the most revolutionary and useful tools available to police
54
officers. Law enforcement officials first applied DNA technology to
the criminal realm in England by profiling DNA samples to identify a
55
suspect in two unsolved murders. Since that time, the FBI, most
states, and even many counties and cities have developed their own
56
forensic DNA laboratories in the United States. The technology is
particularly attractive to investigators and prosecutors because DNA
test results are accurate and provide juries with virtually
incontrovertible evidence linking a criminal defendant to a crime
57
scene. In fact, the American public perceives DNA test results as so
conclusive that the National Research Council’s expert commission
58
on DNA evidence found it necessary to caution courts against
allowing jurors to draw unfairly prejudicial inferences from the
51. See NRC I, supra note 45, at 40 (“With PCR amplification, very small samples
of tissue or body fluids—theoretically even a single nucleated cell—can be used to
study DNA.”).
52. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 26, at 47 (drawing a general comparison
between PCR and RFLP analyses through a discussion of PCR analysis performed at a
gene site named D1S80).
53. See id. at 19 (“RFLP and PCR technology together form the cornerstone of
forensic DNA typing.”).
54. See Manning A. Connors, Comment, DNA Databases: The Case for the Combined
DNA Index System, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 889, 889 (1994) (“The use of DNA for
investigatory purposes is perhaps the most discriminating and efficient prosecutorial
device to be developed since the advent of fingerprinting.”); Tracy & Morgan, supra
note 33, at 636 (noting that the use of DNA evidence “has been hailed as a godsend”
for fighting crime); see also NRC I, supra note 45, at 25 (suggesting that as the use of
DNA evidence in trials becomes more and more common, jurors will come to expect
prosecutors to use it).
55. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 26, at 20 (discussing the historical
development of DNA’s now widely accepted use in criminal investigations).
56. See id. at 20-21 (asserting that federal and local governments reacted quickly
in following the lead of private companies that initially introduced DNA testing in
the United States).
57. See Sue Rosenthal, Note, My Brother’s Keeper: A Challenge to the Probative Value of
DNA Fingerprinting, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 195, 197 (1995) (“No two individuals, outside
of identical twins, share the same genetic pattern.”); Diehl, supra note 35, at 436 (“If
a laboratory matches DNA samples from a crime scene and the suspect, the
probability that the crime scene DNA came from the suspect can be remarkably
high.”).
58. See NRC I, supra note 45, at vii-viii (outlining the creation of The National
Research Council’s Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science in response
to requests from scientists and the legal community for clarification on legal issues
implicating DNA evidence).
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59

evidence.
60
DNA’s significance to this Comment is its durability.
DNA is
useful to prosecutors who practice DNA indictment because they can
store the sample in the hopes of subsequently determining the
61
identity of the sample’s source. With respect to the purpose for the
statute of limitations, then, this practice begs the question: Has the
62
“genius of our laws” become subservient to the genius of our
scientific and technological advances?
Following the lead of the federal government, all fifty states now
63
have similar DNA databases. As a condition of federal funding for
these databases, the states must collect samples from offenders
64
convicted of sex-related felonies. In 1998, the FBI introduced the
National DNA Index System (NDIS), which allows law enforcement
agencies at all levels of government to contribute samples to the
65
national database and thereby increase the odds of initiating a “cold
66
hit.”

59. See id. at 160 (warning that the perception of the infallibility of DNA
evidence, along with its technical complexity, might lead juries to ignore other
evidence).
60. See Tracy & Morgan, supra note 33, at 673 n.105 (noting that samples of DNA
can remain viable for thousands of years if maintained under appropriate
conditions).
61. See Barbara Ross et al., ‘John Doe’ Indicted on DNA Evidence, PITT. POST GAZETTE,
Mar. 16, 2000, at A20 (quoting law enforcement officials as saying, “[n]ow, the
indictment can stand ‘for 100 years,’” and “DNA technology allows us to make
arrests . . . 10 years from now”); David Doege, supra note 22, at 1 (quoting an
Assistant District Attorney as saying, “[w]e’re going to get [the DNA indictee]
someday”) (emphasis added).
62. Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342 (1805) (holding that in a case
involving prosecution for failure to pay a fine after violation of a statute prohibiting
the use of maritime vessels to carry on the slave trade, it “would be utterly repugnant
to the genius of our laws” to allow an untimely criminal prosecution for a non-capital
offense “[i]n a country where not even treason can be prosecuted after a lapse” of
the statutory period).
63. See Tracy & Morgan, supra note 33, at 669 (noting that every state has a DNA
database system either in operation or in the development stages).
64. See id. at 674 (examining the uniformity of database statutes among different
jurisdictions).
65. See id. at 640-41 (discussing the FBI’s technological advances following
introduction of the CODIS).
66. See supra note 43 (defining “cold hit”).
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II. HISTORICAL AND MODERN APPLICATION OF STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS
67

In the criminal context, statutes of limitations set time limits
68
beyond which prosecutors may not pursue a case. Such statutes
balance the competing policy interests of allowing valid claims and
69
Even though the advances in DNA
precluding stale claims.
technology mark tremendous scientific achievements, they also
70
prompt significant legal questions.
Specifically, while the
constitutionality of DNA indictments awaits adjudication in the
courts, the historical purpose, rationale, and judicial application of
statutes of limitations reveal such indictments possess limited validity
71
and legitimacy.
A. Historical Development of Statutes of Limitations
Protocols time-barring the prosecution of crimes have a long
72
Although statutes of limitations
history in the United States.
67. The primary focus of this Comment is on the policy and purpose of statutes
of limitations in the realm of criminal prosecution, and references to statutes
throughout this text are made with this criminal focus in mind. However, statutes of
limitations also exist to bar civil claims. See generally ADOLPH J. LEVY, SOLVING STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS PROBLEMS 5-448 (1987 & Supp. 1992) (discussing civil litigation
strategies for addressing statute of limitations issues in the context of liability,
medical malpractice, wrongful death, governmental liability, the Federal Tort Claims
Act, and the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act). There is great similarity between
the purposes advanced to support these enactments in both the civil and criminal
context. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 n.14 (1971) (explaining the
similarity of policies behind civil and criminal statutes of limitations); see also Alan L.
Adlestein, Conflict of the Criminal Statute of Limitations with Lesser Offenses at Trial, 37
WM. & MARY L. REV. 199, 253 n.234 (1995) (“To trace the origins of American
criminal statutes of limitations, it is important to acknowledge that the civil law, as
well as the English common law, influenced how criminal procedure developed in
the American colonies.”).
68. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1422-23 (defining criminal
statutes of limitations as legislative enactments “establishing a time limit for
prosecuting a crime, based on the date when the offense occurred”).
69. See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 31, at 454-55 (declaring that limiting
statutes attempt to strike a balance between “the extinguishment of untimely claims
and . . . encouraging the resolution of all claims, whether timely or untimely, on
their substantive merits”).
70. See Rosenthal, supra note 57, at 196 (“The advent of DNA analysis has
revolutionized both research science and the judicial system over the course of the
past decade.”); David H. Kaye, DNA Evidence: Probability, Population Genetics, and the
Courts, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 101, 101 (1993) (recognizing that courts, attorneys, and
government agencies, inter alia, have been “struggling with DNA identification
evidence at least since 1985”).
71. See infra Part II.A-C (discussing the historical purpose, rationale, and judicial
application of statutes of limitation).
72. See J. Anthony Chavez, Statutes of Limitations and the Right to a Fair Trial, 10
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addressing real property issues may be traced to ancient Greece,
most legislative limitations as we know them today derive from early
74
English laws governing civil property claims.
The invocation of
75
statutes of limitations gradually became more popular in England,
and by the beginning of the seventeenth century, King James I found
76
it necessary to codify a new statute to allow expansion of the use of
77
limitations.
The first statutory limiting actions in the American colonies
78
descended directly from these early English enactments.
These

CRIM. JUST. 2, 2 (Summer 1995) (noting that “[f]ederal jurisprudence always has
contained statutes of limitations for all crimes, except murder and forgery, to ensure
timely and fair administration of justice”); see also 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions
§ 1 (1970) (recognizing “pleas of limitation were allowed long before there was any
statute on the subject”).
73. See WILLIAM D. FERGUSON, THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS SAVING STATUTES 7
(1978) (“Statutes of limitations relating to real property may be traced to ancient
Greece or beyond through numerous societies that developed in the ancient world.”)
(citation omitted).
74. See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 31, at 454 n.7 (indicating that “the first
English statute of limitations for real property actions” was enacted in 4 Hen. 7, ch.
24 (1487) (Eng.)). But see Thomas E. Atkinson, Some Procedural Aspects of the Statute of
Limitations, 27 COL. L. REV. 157, 157 (1927) (asserting that limitations of time in
criminal and real actions had existed for centuries prior to the seventeenth century).
See generally FERGUSON, supra note 73, at 40 & n.131 (describing the reasons leading to
enactment of the Statute of Fines, 4 Hen. 7, ch. 14 (1487)); id. at 7-9 (discussing the
progression of statutes of limitations and noting that “the first modern style statute”
is 32 Hen. 8, ch. 2 (1540)); id. at 26 (revealing that England’s first statutes of
limitations were intended to quiet men’s estates). Specifically, a woman who claimed
she was raped “was required to proceed immediately to the nearest vill and there
state the injury and show the marks and torn garments, then to report the matter to
the chief officer of the hundred and finally complain in the next county court.” Id.
at n.1 (citing 14 GLANVILLE, TRACTUS DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUNDINIBUS ch. 6 (1554)).
75. See FERGUSON, supra note 73, at 7-12 (explaining the origin and purpose of
statutes of limitations through 1623).
76. See id. at 11-12 (discussing that the enactment of a general statute of
limitations, 21 James I, ch. 16 (1623), was necessary to accommodate the desire to
limit the period available to bring ejectment actions due to the pleading of fictitious
claims to recover leasehold interests under 32 Hen. 8, ch. 2 (1540)).
77. See William M. Schrier, Note, The Guardian or the Ward: For Whom Does the
Statute Toll?, 71 B.U. L. REV. 575, 576 (1991) (“The statute differed from those that
had existed since antiquity in that it covered both personal and real property actions.
Furthermore, it included specific time periods and liberal disability provisions.”)
(citation omitted).
78. See Harvard Law Review Association, Developments in the Law Statutes of
Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1178 (1950) [hereinafter Developments] (“The
Limitation Act of 1623 marks the beginning of the modern law of limitations on
personal actions in the common law.”); Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879)
(noting that the 21st of James I “was adopted in most of the American colonies
before the Revolution, and has since been the foundation of nearly all of the like
legislation in this country”); see also Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (1 Cranch) 336, 342
(1805) (interpreting the American statute at issue by using 21st of James I as a basis
for comparison); Schrier, supra note 77, at 576-77 (noting that King James I’s
Limitation Act of 1623 provided the basis for the colonies’ limiting statutes in preRevolutionary America).
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79

early limiting statutes applied only to civil claims and proved very
80
popular. Shortly after the American Revolution, the States began
enacting statutes limiting the time available for pursuit of criminal
81
82
prosecutions.
Today, all but two states have criminal time
83
limitation periods. Though the respective state legislatures create
84
and control these statutes, the language of the statutes tends to be
85
similar and unambiguous.
The federal government followed the colonies’ lead and during the
second session of the First Congress, the representatives included a
time limitation within a statute defining penalties for treason and
79. See FERGUSON, supra note 73, at 6 (recalling that the earliest English statutes
of limitations addressed property issues, e.g., quieting men’s estates); cf. Adlestein,
supra note 67, at 253 n.234 (“To trace the origins of American criminal statutes of
limitations, it is important to acknowledge that the civil law, as well as the English
common law, influenced how criminal procedure developed in the American
colonies.”).
80. See Adlestein, supra note 67, at 252 (noting that most states had statutes of
limitations at the beginning of the Republic, many of which were derived from
eighteenth-century colonial statutes).
81. See Developments, supra note 78, at 1179 (acknowledging that the states
codified general criminal statutes of limitations at a “fairly early date”); see also N.J.
REV. STAT. § 263 (1820) (enacted in 1796) (limiting prosecution of capital offenses,
except murder, to three years, and non-capital offenses to two years). New York and
Vermont also enacted statutes of limitations before the 19th century. See Adlestein,
supra note 67, at 252 n.233 (providing examples of offenses and their respective
statutory time limitations for prosecution in New York and Vermont).
82. Wyoming and South Carolina are the two states that do not employ a
statutory limitations regime. See Adlestein, supra note 67, at 249-50, 250 & n.223
(noting that while the length of the limitations and the types of offenses they cover
vary from state to state, Wyoming and South Carolina are the only states without any
statutory limitation period); Gary M. Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping
Memories Lie? Words of Caution about Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory
Repression, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 129, 151 n.114 (1993) (listing South
Carolina and Wyoming as states without criminal statutes of limitations for any
crimes and noting that seven other states do not have limitations for felonies).
83. See Adlestein, supra note 67, at 251 n.227 (finding that most states have
limitation periods for prosecuting an offense, but that “[a] single general limitations
period is not typical in state statutes, which commonly differentiate between degrees
of offenses”). But see Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 82, at 151 n.114 (revealing that
in seven states, there is no limiting time period for the prosecution of felonies). The
seven states that do not have statutes of limitations for felonies are Alabama,
Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Virginia, and West Virginia. See
ALA. CODE § 15-3-5(a)(4) (Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500.050 (Michie 1990);
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-106 (Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-1
(1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-21-2 (1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-8 (Michie Supp.
1993); W. VA. CODE § 61-11-9 (1992).
84. See 4 AM. JUR. Trials § 441 (1966) (observing the impossibility of making
generalizations about the length of statutes of limitations among the states because
they are subject to the control of individual legislatures and represent “public policy”
considerations).
85. See Developments, supra note 78, at 1179 (asserting most codifications of
statutory limiting periods provide “either that ‘all actions . . . shall be brought within’
or ‘no action . . . shall be brought more than’ so many years after ‘the cause thereof
accrued.’”).
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86

other capital crimes.
Although Congress extended the statute’s
87
breadth in 1876 and thereafter modified this limiting statute
88
89
periodically, the statute remains in effect today.
Moreover,
Congress has indicated its legislative preference for limiting actions
90
by codifying statutory limitations for a wide variety of actions.
All time-limiting actions remain subject to modification by the will
91
State legislatures and the U.S.
of the relevant legislating body.
Congress explicitly make modifications when they decide to change
92
the limitation periods. Although courts have some discretion in
93
applying statutes of limitations under the tolling doctrine, their
86. See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 32, 1 Stat. 112, 119 (providing a limitation of
three years for treason and all capital crimes (except “wilful murder” and forgery),
and a limitation of two years for all non-capital offenses).
87. See Act of Apr. 13, 1876, ch. 56, 19 Stat. 32. As amended, the statute included
within its scope “most federal crimes.” See Adlestein, supra note 67, at 249 n.222
(providing an historical overview of the development of the criminal statutes of
limitations in the United States).
88. Congress subsequently exempted capital crimes from the statutes of
limitations period in 1939. See Act of Aug. 4, 1939, ch. 419, 53 Stat. 1198 (removing
limitations periods from all capital offenses). In 1948, Congress codified the
statutory limitations in their current sections. See Adlestein, supra note 67, at 249
n.222 (indicating that the Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683, 827-28 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3182 (1988)) codified an exemption of limitations for capital
offenses and limited the statutory period for non-capital offenses to three years). In
1954, Congress extended the period of limitations from three years to five years for
non-capital crimes, unless otherwise excepted. See Act of Sept. 1, 1954, ch. 1214,
§ 10(a), 68 Stat. 1142, 1145, amended by Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-299, 75
Stat. 640, 648 (changing the statute of limitations period to five years for non-capital
offenses).
89. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3182 (1988) (stating the time limits for prosecuting
capital and non-capital offenses).
90. See generally James M. Fisher, The Limits of Statutes of Limitation, 16 SW. U. L.
REV. 1, 35-435 (1986) (providing annotated tables of the federal statutes of
limitations). Accord 4 AM. JUR. Trials § 441 (1966) (contending “[m]ost federally
created rights of action have specific statutes of limitations,” but noting that “there is
no federal statute of limitations of general application”).
91. See 4 AM. JUR. Trials § 441 (1966) (“Limitation of actions is controlled by
statute . . . Statutes of limitation come into law not through the judicial process but
through legislation. They represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate.”);
Adlestein, supra note 67, at 251 (clarifying that, because legislatures control the
statutes, “the time periods in these statutes can be changed at the will of the
legislature or can be eliminated entirely”) (citations omitted).
92. See, e.g., Adelstein, supra note 67, at 249 & n.222, 250 & n.223 (revealing that
as recently as 1988, Congress extended the statute of limitations for criminal
violations of the RICO statute); see also id. at 250 n.223 (noting that “[s]tate statutes
of limitations are frequently amended, usually to extend the limitations periods”);
Michael E. Baughman, Comment, Defining the Boundaries of the Adverse Domination
Doctrine: Is There Any Repose for Corporate Directors?, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1116-17
(1995) (suggesting legislatures have a duty to monitor the application of statutes of
limitations by the courts and “must not shirk [their] responsibility.”); Gail L. Heriot,
A Study in the Choice of Form: Statutes of Limitation and the Doctrine of Laches, 1992 BYU L.
REV. 917, 922 (1992) (implicitly arguing that it seems “dubious” for courts to diverge
from the explicit text of statutes of limitations to adapt the statute to changing
times).
93. Tolling “stop[s] the running of a statute” of limitations. See BLACK’S LAW
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94

B. Rationale Supporting the Statutes of Limitation
Little consensus exists on the purposes compelling the creation of
95
The historical purpose of criminal
civil statutes of limitations.
96
statutes of limitations, however, remains the same today as when first
97
employed: to promote repose. Although the definition of this legal
DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1495 (defining “toll”); see also Michael John Byrne, Let
Truth Be Their Devise: Hargett v. Holland and the Professional Malpractice Statute of Repose,
73 N.C. L. REV. 2209, 2218 (1995) (finding that because of the “harsh results” of the
rigidity of statutes of limitations, “almost all jurisdictions” began to employ methods
of tolling the statutory period).
94. See Kent Sinclair & Charles A. Szypszak, Limitations of Action Under the FTCA: A
Synthesis and Proposal, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 23 (1991) (“The equitable tolling cases
are quite specific in their genesis and limited in scope, and do not offer a broad
exception to applying an otherwise appropriate statute of limitations.”); see also
O’Brien v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 541 N.E.2d 334, 335-36 (Mass. 1989) (declaring
the court will not read a legislative intent to create a short statute of limitations into a
statute when the legislature did not explicitly indicate this preference within the
statute); Schrier, supra note 77, at 576-77 (suggesting most modern limiting statutes
have restricted judicial discretion by specifically codifying the 1623 Limitation Act’s
tolling provisions for minority and mental incompentency); cf. Heriot, supra note 92,
at 952-53 (asserting that by the nineteenth century, American equity courts had
converged so much with the law courts that equity judges realized they “should
accept the length of time stated in the analogous statute of limitations as reasonable
and not deviate from it except in unusual circumstances”).
95. See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 31, at 514 (noting that “[i]t is probably
futile to attempt to isolate a single purpose from among those listed [in the article,
discussing civil statutes of limitations] that sensibly could be assigned a greater
general importance than all of the others”). The ambiguity and confusion over the
reasons justifying civil limiting actions, ironically, results from a popular satisfaction
with the statutes. See Adlestein, supra note 67, at 257 n.251 (suggesting there has
been very little legislative debate over the purposes for statutes of limitation relating
to civil actions because society generally has been content with their operation since
the Limitations Act of 1623). Because the statutes traditionally have not been a point
of contention, the polity has accepted them without any detailed legislative
justification. See FERGUSON, supra note 73, at 40 (“the statutes themselves shed little
or no light upon the underlying purpose of the statutes but only the general
situation sought to be remedied”); see also Mary E. Miller, Barbed Wire in the
Borderland: Statute of Limitations Choices for Wrongful Discharge Claims, 23 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 833, 835 (1986) (“Regarding both English law and the early American statutes,
the intent of the enacting legislatures is not readily apparent.”).
96. See Byrne, supra note 93, at 2216 (“Recent Supreme Court decisions and a
treatise on the limitation of actions have confirmed the persistence” of the purpose
of repose behind the statutes of limitations).
97. See Heriot, supra note 92, at 925 (stating Parliament’s historical policies
behind England’s 1540 limiting statute were “clear,” in that Parliament wanted to
“guard against the dangers of trying a case for which the relevant evidence had been
lost or destroyed . . . .”). “Repose,” is defined as “[c]essation of activity; temporary
rest.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1303. In the context of limiting
actions, however, the term takes on a variety of meanings. See Ochoa & Wistrich,
supra note 31, at 460 (noting the “primary purpose” behind statutes of limitations was
to preserve repose); see also Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321
U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944) (“Statutes of limitation . . . in their conclusive effects are
designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that
have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded,
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98

term varies in scope and language, statutory limitations ultimately
preserve a defendant’s right to assemble evidence and prepare a
99
vigorous defense. Although the first English limiting statutes were
100
designed to quiet estates, American commentators define domestic
101
statutes in terms more relevant to a modern context.
Most importantly, the statutes protect defendants from an unfair
trial by militating against prejudice caused by deterioration of
102
This policy is premised, at least partially, on the theory
evidence.
103
that evidence inherently degenerates with the passage of time.
and witnesses have disappeared.”); Sinclair & Szypszak, supra note 94, at 23 (“The
articulated focus of statutes of limitations . . . seems to be on the difficulties inherent
in litigating stale claims and on the unfairness to defendants that would result from
having to search for evidence that has faded or has been lost due to the passage of
time.”); Adlestein, supra note 67, at 262 (“The Supreme Court’s rationale for
criminal statutes of limitations involves . . . the protection of the individual defendant
from a potentially unfair trial . . . .”); Developments, supra note 78, at 1185 (stating that
the “primary consideration” of statutes with time limitations “is undoubtedly one of
fairness to the defendant”).
98. Compare Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 31, at 460 (“‘[R]epose’ includes at
least four distinct but overlapping concepts: (a) to allow peace of mind; (b) to avoid
disrupting settled expectations; (c) to reduce uncertainty about the future; and
(d) to reduce the cost of measures designed to guard against the risk of untimely
claims”), with MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.06 cmt. 1 (1985) (listing purposes for criminal
statutes of limitations, including “promot[ing] repose by giving security and stability
to human affairs”).
99. See FERGUSON, supra note 73, at 40-43 (debunking the theories that the
statutes are designed to protect the public interest or a plaintiff’s rights); id. at 43
(concluding “it logically appears that the primary purpose of the statutes was to
protect defendant against loss of witnesses and evidence and to protect his acts in
reasonable reliance on plaintiff’s inaction”). But see Adlestein, supra note 67, at 258
n.253 (“The general interest of the public also is served by statutes of limitations” in
the form of judicial efficiency) (quoting 1 CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF
ACTIONS § 1.1, at 16 (1991 & Supp. 1993)). Once again, this analysis is generally
cloaked in the language of civil claims, but its historical basis is applicable to criminal
actions as well. See Adlestein, supra note 67, at 252 (reasoning the policies underlying
civil statutes of limitations facilitate an understanding of their criminal
counterparts).
100. See FERGUSON, supra note 73, at 26 (asserting the purpose of quieting estates
by creating statutes of limitations was only partially achieved in England).
101. For a thorough discussion of the policies favoring and disfavoring statutes of
limitations in the civil context, see generally Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 31, at 460510.
102. See id. at 471-72 (arguing that deterioration or loss of evidence increases the
possibility of unfair prejudice against defendants).
103.
This justification of the limitation system rests on three premises. The first is
that the minimization of error in adjudication is a goal of the legal system.
The second is that, on balance, evidence deteriorates with the passage of
time. The third is that the effects of such deterioration on the accuracy of
the legal system can be avoided by barring all cases commenced after the
limitation period has expired.
Id. at 472; see also Jacqueline Kanovitz, Hypnotic Memories and Civil Sexual Abuse Trials,
45 VAND. L. REV. 1185, 1219 n.147 (1992) (noting experimental memory
psychologists have proven that eyewitness testimony potentially suffers from
infirmities including “incorrect perception at the input stage, internal revisions

BERNASCONIPP

996

10/18/01 4:45 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:979

Similarly, because the interests of a criminal defendant supersede
104
those of a civil counterpart, criminal statutes of limitations are
105
shorter in duration than civil statutes.
As a further protection for
defendants, legislatures intended the statutes to reach only the
explicit circumstances contemplated within the statute’s language,
i.e., they did not provide courts carte blanche to extend their
106
application as individual judges saw fit.
C. Judicial Interpretation of the Statute of Limitations
Despite the popularity of statutes of limitations with society in
107
general, these legislative initiatives were not immediately popular

during the storage phase, and contamination during the retrieval stage,” thereby
rendering a reliance on memory inherently suspect) (citations omitted). In addition
to the unreliability of the quality of memory, the natural process of “internal selfelaboration on memory,” or “confabulation,” leads to the danger that human
memory will “account for missing information by supplying the missing details from
the subject’s general store of life experiences or from logical deductions about what
the missing information ought to be.” Id. at 1230 n.190 (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
The dangers of faulty memory only increase during crimes, such as forcible sexual
assaults, that involve the use of intimidating weapons. See id. at 1232 n.204 (“In a
highly stressful state people concentrate more on just a few features from their
environment, and they consequently pay less attention to others. This selectivity of
attention can be seen when people experience crimes involving weapons.”) (quoting
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & JAMES F. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
50-51 (1987)).
104. See Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 82, at 148 (noting courts recognize that “a
criminal charge portends far greater consequences than a civil charge”);
Developments, supra note 78, at 1186 (recognizing that criminal defendants seek to
protect the “special interest” of preserving their freedom, as distinct from the
interests that defendants in civil actions seek to protect); see also Heidi L. Neuendorf,
Note, The Judicial Impediment on Legislative Lawmaking in Stratmeyer v. Stratmeyer, 44
S.D. L. REV. 115, 144 (1999) (delineating the higher burden of proof required to
prevail over criminal, as opposed to civil, defendants).
105. See Neuendorf, supra note 104, at 144 (arguing that criminal statutes of
limitations are shorter because the ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard for
criminal prosecutions necessitate a more vigilant preservation of evidence and
protection against stale claims); see also Adlestein, supra note 67, at 255-56 n.240
(positing that shorter durations for criminal statutes of limitations might initially
have been the result of American colonists’ fears of state oppression, and concluding
the statutory periods “tended to become fixed” once they initially became established
in American law).
106. See Heriot, supra note 92, at 954-55 (decrying courts’ extensions of limiting
statutes through judicially-created mechanisms such as “discovery rules,” which allow
actions to commence beyond the statutorily-prescribed period if the injury is not
discoverable until some point in time beyond the applicable statutory period).
“Prior to the advent of discovery rules, statutes of limitation essentially operated like
this: A specific length of time was selected by the legislature to cover all cases that fell
into a particular category of substantive law.” Id. (emphasis added).
107. See Adlestein, supra note 67, at 252-60 (suggesting that there has been very
little legislative debate over the statutes’ purposes because society generally has been
content with their operation since the Limitations Act of 1623).
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108

with American courts.
In this respect, the American experience
once again mirrored the historical development of the statutes in
109
England.
Over time, however, judicial attitudes shifted dramatically. In 1805,
the Supreme Court of the United States declared it would be unfair
and illogical to allow a criminal prosecution after the statutory period
110
elapsed. By 1879, the Court had acknowledged the importance of
111
limiting actions to civilized society.
The Court indicated that the
true value of the limitation periods rests in their ability to protect
112
defendants from “stale demands”
that could prejudice the
defendant because of fading memories or an inability to summon
113
witnesses.
Up to contemporary times, the Court consistently has
recognized the value of these limitations in promoting repose and
protecting suspects from the potential jeopardy of defending against
114
stale claims.
In emphasizing the importance of protecting
108. See 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 5 (1970) (reviewing the “inhospitable
reception” that statutes of limitations received by the courts); Developments, supra note
78, at 1188 (noting that there are “numerous references” documenting courts’ initial
hostility towards statutes of limitations).
109. See FERGUSON, supra note 73, at 28-29 (noting that English courts, especially
beginning in 1698, discouraged use of the statute and “increasingly permitted
avoidance” of its limitations by interpreting it in a very strict and narrow sense, so as
to allow its application in only very limited instances and capacities).
110. See Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342 (1805) (recognizing the
inherent contradiction in allowing a prosecution for a non-capital offense after the
statutory deadline expired, while simultaneously upholding the limiting period on
capital crimes).
111. See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) (“Statutes of limitation are
vital to the welfare of society and are favored in the law. They are found and
approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence . . . [the statutes] promote
repose by giving security and stability to human affairs.”).
112. See Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 351, 360, 373-75 (1828) (refusing to
allow a claim to proceed against a partnership after the relevant statute of limitations
had expired, even though the plaintiff claimed the defendants’ debt was “preexisting”).
113. See id. at 373-75 (ruling that allowing a claim after the expiration of the
limiting action defeats the spirit and intent of the statute of limitations, i.e.,
preventing “the introduction of stale and dormant demands, of long standing, and of
uncertain proof”).
114. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (confirming that “the
plea of limitations” is a “meritorious defense”) (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v.
United States, 304 U.S. 126, 136 (1938)); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321
(1971) (choosing to apply the statute of limitations, rather than the Sixth
Amendment, to protect a defendant from potential prejudice that may be caused
when “[p]assage of time . . . may impair memories, cause evidence to be lost, deprive
the defendant of witnesses, and otherwise interfere with his ability to defend
himself”); Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970) (declaring that
limiting statutes are “designed to protect individuals from having to defend
themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the
passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in
the far-distant past”); Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 215-16, 226 (1953)
(enforcing “a longstanding congressional ‘policy of repose’ that is fundamental to
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defendants from stale claims, the Court explicitly has acknowledged
115
that limiting statutes will extinguish otherwise valid claims.
D. Statute of Limitations Issues Implicated by DNA Indictment
At first glance, the accuracy and durability of DNA evidence
collected from the scene of a rape or other sexual crime appears to
116
help solve America’s growing criminal problems. Consideration of
the issue beyond the superficial surface, however, suggests this sense
of security and confidence is based on two potentially erroneous
assumptions. First, the theory assumes that a person whose DNA is
collected from a crime scene participated in the reported crime.
Second, DNA evidence presumes that determining the identity of the
perpetrator constitutes the only, or alternatively the most important,
goal in a criminal investigation.
These assumptions are consistent with the “get tough on crime”
117
mentality engulfing the nation.
Ironically, courts initially were
reluctant to apply statutes of limitations despite their popularity with
118
Now, however, courts appear willing to apply these
society.
our society and our criminal law” and deciding to apply the statute in the absence of
“a clear [legislative] direction” to the contrary) (quotation marks in original);
Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412, 418 (1943) (noting that the statutes should
be enforced even though “[e]very statute of limitations, of course, may permit a
rogue to escape”); United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 522 (1932) (stating the
statute of limitations should be “liberally interpreted in favor of repose”); see also
Developments, supra note 78, at 1189 (“Modern American courts . . . have generally
exhibited an attitude favorable to liberal imposition of the statutory bar, both in civil
and in criminal actions . . . .”).
115. See Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 125 (“[S]tatutes of limitations often make it
impossible to enforce what were otherwise perfectly valid claims. But that is their
very purpose, and they remain as ubiquitous as the statutory rights or other rights to
which they are attached or are applicable.”). But see Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R.
Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (“This policy of repose, designed to protect
defendants, is frequently outweighed . . . where the interests of justice require
vindication of the plaintiff’s rights.”) (emphasis added).
Despite this author’s recognition of an alleged rape victim’s substantial interests in
justice, the Court’s words in Burnett are specifically applied to civil trials, as evidenced
by the reference to “plaintiff’s rights.” Id. It is unlikely the Court would apply this
reasoning to a criminal prosecution because a criminal defendant’s interests
outweigh the interests of a defendant in a civil claim. See supra notes 104-105
(emphasizing a defendant’s interest in liberty); see also Heriot, supra note 92, at 91920 (“Indeed, the statute of limitations does sometimes produce results that seem
hypertechnical in view of its underlying policy concerns. Like all rules, it is both
overinclusive and underinclusive.”).
116. See Sink & Spice, supra note 12, at 1B (reflecting law enforcement’s reliance
on DNA evidence to resolve heretofore unsolvable cases); Charges, supra note 5
(indicating that DNA indictments “really show the power of DNA evidence and how
valued DNA testing has become for both law enforcement and prosecutors”).
117. See Tracy & Morgan, supra note 33, at 670 (discussing the “‘get tough’ on
crime mentality” as a reason for some states’ expansion in the number of crimes that
require submission of samples to DNA databanks).
118. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text (reflecting judicial disfavor of
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statutes in the face of society’s objection.
By vindicating rape survivors’ rights, DNA indictments bring at
least a modicum of comfort to those whose claims would otherwise be
121
time-barred.
Proponents hail DNA indictments for providing law
122
enforcement more time to investigate criminal offenses. However,
DNA indictments disregard the very purpose for which statutes of
limitations were enacted: to provide repose and to preclude
defendants from being held to answer stale charges so outdated they
presumptively impede defendants’ abilities to marshal potentially
123
exculpatory evidence.
Indicting DNA to avoid the statute of
limitations directly contradicts the legislative policies that gave rise to
124
limiting actions.
The argument that rape survivors’ interests should take precedence
over statutes of limitations posits that the accuracy of DNA typing
outweighs any potentially exculpatory evidence the defendant might

statutes of limitations).
119. See supra notes 110-114 and accompanying text (detailing the courts’ shift in
attitude in favor of applying statutes of limitations).
120. See Unknown Man, supra note 4 (reflecting the feeling that criminals who
commit horrible crimes should be brought to justice and should not be allowed to
benefit from their anonymity); see also Adlestein, supra note 67, at 260 (asking,
rhetorically, why criminals should be afforded amnesty for serious offenses, like
manslaughter and rape, just by virtue of the passage of time).
121. See Betty DeRamus, Memories of Sexual Assault Have No Limits, So Why Should the
Crime?, DET. NEWS, June 1, 2000, at 1 (“[B]eing able to identify and catch the
perpetrator would ease the pain and trauma of the [rape] victim. We’d all feel
better.”); Hanh Kim Quach, Senate Panel OKs Rape Bill, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June
29, 2000, at A4 (quoting a rape survivor as saying, “[s]ix years (statute of limitations)
is insulting to women who have been raped”); Willing, supra note 4, at 1A (quoting a
rape victim, whose case was the subject of a DNA indictment, as saying, “I can now
put some closure on my personal matter and put something negative into something
positive”); Heather Lourie, Clock May Cease to Aid Rapists, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Jan.
16, 2000, at A1 (citing a rape survivor’s frustration upon learning the case against her
alleged attacker had been time-barred: “What’s the point of our justice system? Why
do they bother?”).
122. See B.G. Gregg, DNA Proposal Targets Rapists, DET. NEWS, June 6, 2000, at 1
(noting that indicting a criminal under the name “John Doe” would provide police
additional time to find the person who matched the DNA).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 96-105 (describing generally the purpose
behind the statute of limitations).
124. See Baughman, supra note 92, at 1115 (“Legislatures create statutes of
limitation for a purpose—namely, for granting repose to defendants and increasing
judicial efficiency by preventing stale claims.”). Baughman goes on to argue that
allowing courts the discretion to determine when an action “accrued,” and therefore
when the respective statute of limitations begins to run, “undermines the legislative
policies that were the basis of statutes of limitations. Why would a legislature create”
a limiting period if it were possible to still bring the charge long after the statutory
period expired? Id. at 1116. See also Developments, supra note 78, at 1191 (asserting
that the constitutional protection against ex post facto laws “precludes the removal of
a bar already raised by criminal limitations”). A DNA indictment essentially removes
the statutory limiting period protecting criminal defendants.
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125

otherwise procure for his defense.
This argument, while
compelling if true, tenuously draws on the inferences of too many
assumptions to establish a general principle. Independently, without
corroborating testimony or evidence, the presence of a person’s DNA
in a particular place indicates, at best, the person was present in that
126
place in the past. The DNA, by itself, does not indicate why, when,
127
or how it arrived at the scene.
With this fact in mind, a DNA sample derived from semen found
128
during a victim’s post-rape hospital examination might be the most
probative type of forensic evidence for DNA analysis involving sexual
crimes. Even this evidence, however, is not dispositive with respect to
the alleged rapist’s guilt. In such an instance, the issue of the victim’s
129
alleged consent becomes paramount. Even when the issue turns on
consent, a defendant certainly will find it more difficult to
corroborate a legitimate consent defense with witnesses and other
130
131
evidence at a point fifteen years or more after the alleged rape.
125. See Diehl, supra note 35, at 436 (stating the proposition that if the probative
value of the DNA evidence is sufficiently high, “the defendant is unlikely to be
prejudiced by the disappearance of other evidence, at least in the sense that any
evidence the witness might have lost would be unlikely to change the outcome of the
trial”); Peter Slevin, For DNA Detectives, the Workload is Exploding, WASH. POST, Nov. 14,
2000, at A3 (quoting the District of Columbia’s medical examiner, Jonathan L.
Arden, as implying that DNA invariably implicates only the guilty).
126. Even this proposition is tenuous, however. Consider, for example, the
situation in which a person (Person #1) is in a crowded room (or elevator or
nightclub) and several of the person’s hair fibers are transferred to an adjacent
person’s (Rapist’s) clothing, to which they stick. If the Rapist proceeds to commit a
sexual crime, the transferred hair fibers from Person #1 are left at the crime scene by
the Rapist. Then law enforcement officials may hold Person #1 as culpable for the
crime, if the hair fibers are indeed recovered from the crime scene. See Diehl, supra
note 35, at 432 (indicating that hair is one source susceptible to DNA testing).
127. See id. at 438 (considering that the innocence of a hypothetical rape suspect
could be questioned when he passed by the crime scene prior to the crime,
inadvertently left blood there, and left before the crime commenced).
128. See Michael O. Allen, Rape Kit Funding Pushed, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 5, 2000,
at 5 (reflecting a legislator’s frustration with funding decisions concerning the
testing of “rape kits,” which hospital personnel use to gather and save DNA evidence
when a woman alleges she has been raped).
129. See Diehl, supra note 35, at 439-40 (noting and criticizing a legislative
proposal designed to protect defendants truthfully claiming consent by limiting the
DNA exception to the statute of limitations to defendants who are unknown to the
victim, under the theory that defendants known to the victim are more likely to have
consensual sex with the victim).
130. The statute of limitations for rape in Massachusetts, for example, is fifteen
years. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 277, § 63 (1992).
131. The author recognizes the slim likelihood of a consenting woman falsely to
allege rape within such a brief time after the incident so as to allow for collection of
the DNA evidence. However, the purpose of this Comment is not so much to
measure such probabilities as it is to acknowledge potential infirmities that may
prejudice an otherwise innocent defendant.
Consider, for example, the hypothetical situation in which a married man meets a
woman at a bar, they both consume alcohol, and ultimately engage in intercourse
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Additional circumstances exist whereby allowing DNA as probative
evidence of a rape suspect’s guilt prejudices an otherwise innocent
132
defendant, through misidentification and improper handling of
133
DNA evidence (leading to cross-contamination), for example.
This summary of potential problems that inhere in the use of DNA
evidence long after the criminal conduct occurs is not intended to be
134
exhaustive. Rather, it offers a brief overview of the conflict between
the practice of DNA indictment and the purpose of limiting actions
to protect defendants from answering charges prompted by stale
evidence.
DNA remains an incredibly useful tool in solving crimes and
resolving questions of identity. However, the practice of indicting
135
DNA substantially conflicts with the historical development,
136
137
purpose,
and judicial attitudes
toward modern statutes of
the same night. The man, feeling guilty after contemplating his infidelity, leaves
abruptly without intending any further contact with the woman, even though he
never considered the possibility she never consented. If the woman has a different
perspective and goes to the hospital immediately after the man leaves and asserts her
belief she was raped, and the man’s DNA is recovered, it may be entered into an
offender database. If the man is convicted of a violent offense, for example, twenty
years later and is matched to his DNA from the adulterous night, he might be held to
answer for the rape charge. In such an instance, he would likely find it difficult to
find witnesses with memories strong enough to bolster his version of the evening’s
events. See, e.g., In a First, Rape Charge Based on No-Name Warrant Issued for DNA,
BIOTECH. NEWSWATCH, Nov. 6, 2000, at 4 (citing San Francisco’s chief public
defender remarking, “It’s difficult for a defendant to mount a defense that is six
years old”); Willing, supra note 4, at 3A (quoting a New York City defense attorney
saying, “[s]uppose the sex was consensual. After 15 or 20 years, how’s he supposed
to find the witnesses who can back his story up?”).
132. Recall that no two people have the same genetic make-up—except for twins.
See Rosenthal, supra note 57, at 197 (indicating identical twins have identical genetic
structure). Consider the hypothetical occurrence of a rape linked to one of two
identical twins many years after a crime occurred. In this situation, the memories of
witnesses who could provide an alibi for the innocent suspect/brother are extremely
important, but may have deteriorated beyond recall by the time the prosecution
commences. See Ochoa and Wistrich, supra note 31, at 474-75 (detailing the rapid
rate at which memory deteriorates).
133. See generally William C. Thompson, Accepting Lower Standards: The National
Research Council’s Second Report on Forensic DNA Evidence, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 405, 417-20
(1997) (suggesting various sources of error in analyzing and interpreting DNA
evidence and results).
134. See Richard Lempert, After the DNA Wars: Skirmishing with NRC II, 37
JURIMETRICS J. 439, 444 (1997) (listing as possible reasons leading to an erroneous
positive match: (1) the real criminal had DNA matching the suspect’s at the tested
loci; (2) the expert forensic scientist lied in their testimony; (3) the police failed to
properly consider the relevant suspect pool; (4) lab error; and, (5) intentional or
inadvertent contamination by police).
135. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (revealing the legislative
preference for statutes of limitations and establishing legislatures’ ability to modify
the statute to adapt to modern circumstances).
136. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text (outlining the long-standing
purpose of repose served by statutes of limitations and reiterating potential causes of
prejudice a criminal defendant would face without such limiting actions); see also
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limitations. The better solution remains for legislatures to modify
138
their respective statutes of limitations, either by extending them
139
within explicitly-drawn parameters or abolishing them altogether
for rape and other sexual crimes when investigators collect DNA
140
Such a solution would settle lingering legal questions
evidence.
Developments, supra note 78, at 1187 (concluding that questions about the propriety of
a statutory limiting period should rely upon an analysis of the underlying purposes
served by a limiting action).
137. See Developments, supra note 78, at 1189 (explaining that courts strictly
construe criminal statutes of limitations, even if it leads to an “[un]reasonable
result,” because “courts are reluctant to create exceptions where the legislatures have
not explicitly done so”).
138. See id. at 1188 (maintaining that the most effective means of resolving a legal
controversy over interpretation of the rights and remedies afforded by statutes of
limitations lies in the hands of the legislating entities). “On existing causes of action,
the [duration of the limiting period] may always be lengthened, even as to criminal
prosecutions . . . .” Id. at 1190. Generally, a decision about the existence or duration
of a specific statute of limitations is a policy matter that lies within the province of the
legislatures, not the courts. See id. at 1179 (articulating that legislatures have made
similar policy decisions, generally speaking, in excluding particular felonies, e.g.,
murder, manslaughter, arson, and forgery, from the statute of limitations); Adlestein,
supra note 67, at 252 (“Criminal statutes of limitations are thus flexible instruments
of legislative policy and often reflect the social concerns of the particular time and
locality.”).
139. See Diehl, supra note 35, at 439 (suggesting courts have discretion to ignore
the statute of limitations if the prosecution meets a burden of showing that a rape
victim did not know her alleged attacker, thereby avoiding the consent defense).
Diehl further lists several methods by which laboratories might reduce possible
scientific error and recommends that prosecutors split the DNA evidence with
defendants to allow the defense to perform its own testing. See id. at 440.
Legislatures also might consider, for example, tolling the statute of limitations
upon a showing of evidence corroborating the DNA test results to support an
accusation against a defendant who might otherwise avoid the charge by raising a
statute of limitations defense. See, e.g., Ernsdorff & Loftus, supra note 82, at 132
(recommending that courts require independent corroborating evidence to support
adult victims of child sexual abuse who bring civil actions against their alleged
abusers based on repressed memory retrieved through hypnosis as an adult).
Several legislatures already have started to re-examine their statutes against the
backdrop of DNA indictments. See, e.g., Dennis Chaptman, Lift Time Limit for Rape
Cases, Legislators Urge, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Nov. 4, 1999, at 20 (reporting that a
bill abolishing the statute of limitations, when fingerprint evidence is also retrieved,
passed one chamber of the Wisconsin legislature); Terry Hillig, Judge Declares Man a
Habitual Offender, Gives Him Life Sentence, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 27, 2000, at
B4 (reporting the legislature entertained proposals from prosecutors on increasing
the statutes of limitations for felony sex offenses); Deborah Kalb, Torricelli Bill Would
Abolish 5-Year Statute of Limitations for Rape, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, June 14, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 4401064 (reporting legislative proposals to abolish the statute of
limitations for rape, introduced into the United States Senate); Limits of Prosecution,
DET. NEWS, Mar. 29, 2000, at 14 (discussing legislative proposals to extend Michigan’s
statute of limitations); Week in Review, DES MOINES REG., Feb. 20, 2000, at 5 (“Rep.
Charles Larson . . . and Sen. Andy McKean . . . say the three-year statute of limitations
in rape cases needs to be reconsidered in light of technological advances.”); Willing,
supra note 4, at 1A (“At least seven other states [in addition to New Jersey, Florida,
and Nevada] are considering eliminating or extending their statutes of limitation for
crimes that can be solved by DNA evidence.”).
140. See Sex Offenders and Statutes of Limitations (CNNfn television broadcast, Feb.
24, 2000) (transcript on file in Lexis-Nexis Library, Transcripts File) (listing New
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over defendants’ statutory rights and preserve institutional integrity,
instead of forcing prosecutors to find a loophole through which to
press what otherwise would constitute stale charges. Furthermore,
after legislative modification of statutes of limitations, suspects
defending charges so old that potential prejudice remains would still
retain the ability to invoke their Sixth Amendment speedy trial right
141
to dismiss the charges.
A comparison between DNA and
fingerprint evidence reveals that, aside from the potential prejudice
inherent in defending stale claims, DNA indictees might suffer
further prejudice both at the indictment and the trial stage, for which
they might require Sixth Amendment relief.
III. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF FINGERPRINT SAMPLES
From the time that Alec Jeffreys described his then-new DNA
142
typing technique as “DNA fingerprinting” in 1984,
the
143
nomenclature stuck and with it follows the natural comparison with
traditional fingerprint analysis.
Criminal investigators and
prosecutors have come to recognize DNA as the most accurate and
effective investigative tool since the advent of traditional fingerprint
144
techniques. Proponents of DNA indictments claim DNA’s ability to
identify previously unknown suspects outweighs any prejudice
defendants might face due to the lapse of time between the crime
145
and the indictment, and thus justifies use of DNA indictments.
A comparison of the accuracy of DNA versus fingerprint evidence
reveals that this argument remains subject to attack on several
grounds. The following comparison outlines the benefits and
inherent limitations of both types of evidence, concluding
prosecutors should employ the same restraint with cases based on
DNA evidence as they have shown with fingerprint evidence.

Jersey, Nevada, and Florida as states that have eliminated their statutes of limitations
for rape); Heather Lourie, DNA Alters Rape Law, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 26, 2000,
at A1 (reporting enactment of a law in California eliminating the statute of
limitations if investigators analyze the sample within two years of the crime).
141. See infra notes 298-301 and accompanying text (finding that a delay of five
years or greater between the indictment and an arrest will provide the DNA indictee
with a potential speedy trial defense).
142. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 26, at 20 (describing the historical
development of DNA profiling).
143. A simple LEXIS search in the “Law Reviews, Combined” database for the
term “DNA fingerprinting” reveals at least 250 documents containing the term
(performed Nov. 25, 2000).
144. See Connors, supra note 54, at 889 (describing forensic DNA analysis through
a comparison with fingerprint evidence).
145. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (citing claims that DNA results are
so accurate as to outweigh any prejudice to a defendant).
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A. Historical Use of Fingerprints as an Identification Technique
146

The use of traditional, or dermatoglyphic, fingerprints to identify
people dates back over two thousand years to ancient times, when the
Chinese used thumbprints in lieu of signatures for legal documents
147
and criminal confessions. The first recorded use of fingerprints as
tools to determine identification occurred in 1684, when Dr.
Nehemiah Grew issued a report to London’s Royal Society describing
148
the ridges and pores on the hands and feet. In 1788, J.C.A. Mayer
became the first researcher to announce that fingerprints are unique
to each person, though his research was not precise enough to allow
the inference that fingerprints could always distinguish one person
149
from another.
Fingerprints’ first foray into criminal justice occurred when a
Scottish doctor practicing in Japan used them to exonerate a man
accused of burglary by showing that the prints left at the crime scene
150
did not belong to the accused.
In 1897, a German researcher
established the applicability of dermatoglyphic prints to identification
of criminal suspects by demonstrating fingerprints do not change
151
over time.
Shortly thereafter, in 1899, Edward Henry published a
book delineating a classification system for taking and filing
152
England and Wales
fingerprints in criminal investigations.
153
implemented the Henry classification system in 1901.
With
modifications by the FBI, law enforcement agencies in the United
154
States continue to use the Henry system today.

146. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 26, at 6 (comparing and contrasting
dermatoglyphic fingerprints with current DNA typing methods).
147. See JOE NICKELL & JOHN F. FISCHER, CRIME SCIENCE 112 (1999) (asserting that
the Chinese use of fingerprinting was the “earliest recognition of the uniqueness of
fingerprints and their suitability for personal identification”).
148. See ANNITA T. FIELD, FINGERPRINT HANDBOOK 3 (1959) (listing a chronology of
the use of fingerprints).
149. See id. at 4 (noting that Mayer determined that skin ridges were unique to
each individual and that the similarities in fingerprints were very close in some
people).
150. See NICKELL & FISCHER, supra note 147, at 113 (noting an article published by
a physician, Dr. Henry Faulds, sparked a debate with Herschel over who deserved
credit for pioneering the fingerprinting technique).
151. See Field, supra note 148, at 4 (describing how researcher Herman Weckler
compared and published a print of his own palm taken in 1856 with another print
taken in 1897).
152. See NICKELL & FISCHER, supra note 147, at 114 (noting that Henry, Herschel’s
successor in India, further developed Herschel’s scholarship to create a workable
classification system). Henry completed his research in 1899 and published a book
the next year. See id. at 115-16.
153. See id.
154. See id. (noting the FBI has modified the system to adapt it to the agency’s
changing needs).
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In 1903, officials in the United States first used fingerprinting in
the criminal context to distinguish between two men at Leavenworth
155
Prison who looked alike and bore the same name. Prison officials
booking an incoming inmate named Will West became confused
when they recognized West’s name, physical features, and
measurements, because the man West resembled already was
156
incarcerated at Leavenworth.
This scenario provided the impetus
for Leavenworth and prisons nationwide to adopt a system of
157
fingerprinting.
The following year the St. Louis, Missouri police
department officially adopted a fingerprint classification system to
158
assist in its crime-fighting endeavors. Between 1905 and 1908, the
U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps followed suit and adapted a
fingerprint system to fit their needs, while the federal government’s
acceptance of fingerprint analysis culminated in 1908 when the
precursor to the FBI implemented a fingerprint identification
159
system.
The increasing use by law enforcement agencies of dermatoglyphic
analysis invariably compelled criminal defendants to attack the
validity of fingerprints as evidence in criminal trials. The first
reported case involving a legal challenge to fingerprint evidence
160
occurred in People v. Jennings in 1911. In upholding a murder
conviction, the Jennings court relied on “standard authorities on
161
scientific subjects” and found the trial court properly admitted
155. See id. at 115 (retelling the story of “The Two Will Wests,” a situation which
fingerprinting advocates exploited to demonstrate that fingerprints could “infallibly
distinguish one man from others”).
156. See id. (explaining that the two men were actually identical twins, although
they denied any relationship to each other).
157. See id. (noting that Leavenworth reportedly transferred to a fingerprint
identification system “the next day”); see also id. at 115-16 (listing New York’s Sing
Sing Prison, the United States Army, Navy and Marine Corps as some of the
organizations following Leavenworth’s lead). In fact, there were so many fingerprint
technicians employed that they created the International Association of
Identification in 1915. See id.
Prior to adopting a fingerprint-based system, prisons and law enforcement
agencies used the bertillonage method of identification. See NICKELL & FISCHER, supra
note 147, at 114 (describing the process as a system of anthropometry, which is the
science of measuring the human body, by taking measurements of the length of the
left arm, length and breadth and diameter of the skull, length of left middle and
little fingers, length of the left foot, length of the right ear, and recording of other
physical characteristics for each individual).
158. See FIELD, supra note 148, at 5 (recognizing the foresight of St. Louis as having
the first police department in the country to embrace fingerprinting).
159. See NICKELL & FISCHER, supra note 147, at 115-16 (detailing further the
government’s acceptance of fingerprint analysis by noting that Congress established
the FBI’s Identification Division in 1924 to serve as the central repository of all
fingerprint records obtained by the FBI).
160. 296 N.E. 1077 (Ill. 1911).
161. Id. at 1081.
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fingerprint evidence. Although commentators have since criticized
163
this decision for its shortsighted logic, Jennings paved the way for
164
admission of fingerprint evidence nationwide.
Bolstered by the Jennings decision, prosecutors successfully
introduced fingerprint evidence throughout the following decade in
165
166
167
168
criminal trials in New Jersey, New York, Nevada and Texas. By
1932, the federal courts accepted the reliability of fingerprint
169
Today, forensic
evidence in establishing a suspect’s identity.
fingerprint analysis has evolved to become one of the cornerstones of
170
criminal investigations. Judges take judicial notice of the accuracy
of fingerprinting rather than requiring prosecutors to establish
171
reliability of the process itself.
Fingerprint evidence impacts
criminal prosecution and trials to such an extent that the courts
subsequently invoked its success as the basis for admitting other
172
identification evidence—including DNA.
The question remains,
162. See id. (relying upon encyclopedias and treatises on criminal law as the basis
for confirming the trial court’s decision).
163. See, e.g., Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative
Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1085-86 (1998)
(criticizing the oft-cited hypothesis, upon which the Jennings court accepted
fingerprint evidence as reliable, that fingerprints from two individuals can never be
the same). Saks argues it is impossible to declare conclusively that no two
fingerprints are the same without comparing all possible samples. See id. at 1086 (“It
mattered not that the hypothesis never could be proved.”).
164. See id. at 1085 (noting that once the courts accepted fingerprint evidence as
being uniquely identifying, fingerprint impressions became the standard form of
identification evidence).
165. See State v. Cerciello, 90 A. 1112, 1115 (N.J. 1914) (holding that fingerprint
evidence could be admitted, although the court was unaware if it was actually offered
into evidence).
166. See People v. Roach, 109 N.E. 618, 623 (N.Y. 1915) (concluding that
fingerprint evidence was reliable because of the progress made by scientists and
police investigators throughout the world).
167. See State v. Kuhl, 175 P. 190, 195-96 (Nev. 1918) (relying on science and
expert witness testimony as the basis for admitting fingerprint evidence).
168. See McGarry v. State, 200 S.W. 527, 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 1918) (holding that
fingerprint evidence did not violate the defendant’s rights and the evidence could be
admitted).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1932) (“But, as a means
of identification, [fingerprinting] is just as useful and important where the offense is
a misdemeanor [as it is in felony cases] . . . It can really be objected to only because it
may furnish strong evidence of a man’s guilt.”).
170. See RICHARD SAFERSTEIN, CRIMINALISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC
SCIENCE 412 (5th ed. 1995) (“Today the fingerprint is the pillar of modern criminal
identification.”).
171. See M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Fingerprints, Palm Prints, or Bare Footprints as
Evidence, 28 A.L.R. 2D 1115 (1953) (“So general is the use of fingerprint
identification and so accurate are the results therefrom that in many cases it has
been expressly declared that the courts will take judicial notice thereof.”).
172. See Saks, supra note 163, at 1085 (“Once the courts accepted fingerprint
evidence as being uniquely identifying, fingerprints became an icon for every other
kind of identification evidence—tool marks, bullets, bite marks, handwriting,
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however, whether the accuracy of DNA profiling, relative to
fingerprinting, justifies the use of DNA indictments.
B. Comparison between Dermatoglyphic and DNA Evidence
Researchers liken DNA to dermatoglyphic fingerprints because
173
both provide a highly individualistic sample. The value of each to
174
law enforcement efforts thus far has been substantial.
The use of
DNA analysis to identify suspects is a procedure that, like
175
176
Thus, a
fingerprinting, will endure for many years to come.
comparison of DNA and fingerprint analysis will facilitate an
understanding of the issues implicated in the subsequent discussion
about the impact of DNA indictments on defendants’ abilities to
177
receive a fair trial.
First, jurors often hold the misperception that DNA evidence
178
possesses “an aura of infallibility.”
Jurors continue to improperly
179
weigh DNA evidence even though fingerprint evidence remains, as
voiceprints, shoe prints, broken glass, and so on.”).
173. See NRC I, supra note 45, at 29 (describing the “useful[ness]” of comparing
DNA samples with fingerprints, as each provides an “individualizing characteristic”
that derives from the “personal uniqueness of the patterns”).
174. See Tracy & Morgan, supra note 33, at 636-37 (reflecting the value of both
procedures through the claim that DNA is “the next great breakthrough since
fingerprints”).
175. See generally FIELD, supra note 148, at 3-6 (revealing the longevity of the use of
dermatoglyphic fingerprinting through a chronological listing of its use in
identifying criminal suspects).
176. See Tracy & Morgan, supra note 33, at 636 (indicating the need to address
significant policy questions regarding DNA testing because, “as with fingerprints, it
looks like DNA testing and associated databases are here to stay”).
177. For a more specific treatment of the possibility that DNA indictments impede
defendants’ abilities to receive a fair trial, see infra Part IV.D.
178. See Commonwealth v. Curnin, 565 N.E.2d 440, 441 (Mass. 1991) (refusing to
admit DNA evidence at a rape defendant’s trial because the probability of the
defendant’s DNA randomly matching the crime scene evidence at 1 in 59 million
“must have a strong impact on a jury”); NRC I, supra note 45, at 161 (insisting that
DNA evidence, like all other laboratory work, is subject to error). The National
Research Council found the potential for juror misuse of DNA evidence to be so
potentially damaging to a defendant that it officially recommended a study to
develop methods of decreasing the misinterpretation of DNA evidence. See
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 204
(1996) [hereinafter NRC II] (“Recommendation 6.1: Behavioral research should be
carried out to identify any conditions that might cause a trier of fact to misinterpret
evidence on DNA profiling and to assess how well various ways of presenting expert
testimony on DNA can reduce such misunderstandings.”).
179. See Jonathan J. Koehler et. al, The Random Match Probability in DNA Evidence:
Irrelevant and Prejudicial?, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 201, 212 (1995) [hereinafter Koehler]
(maintaining jurors may “overweight” very small probabilities that an innocent
defendant’s DNA would randomly match genetic material from the crime scene
because: (1) people tend unfairly to give more evidentiary weight to statistics, like
extremely small DNA random match probabilities, because they remain vivid and
memorable when juries go to deliberate; and (2) people also tend to “combine
probabilistic items of evidence by averaging them”).
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shown below, the superior identification technique. Because DNA
profiling has not reached a level of reliability comparable to that of
181
fingerprinting, triers of fact unfairly draw inferences against a
defendant based on DNA evidence that might otherwise be
182
warranted only by fingerprint analysis.
Second, a direct correlation between the respective abilities of
The authors’ article supports this hypothesis with compelling data. The authors
conducted two studies in which they provided mock jurors and laypersons with a fact
pattern typical in a criminal murder prosecution. See id. at 212-13 (describing the
protocol of the study). When the fact pattern presented random match probability
evidence revealing that an innocent defendant’s DNA would match DNA from the
crime scene in a probability of 1 in 1 billion, the jurors voted to convict two or three
times more often than a control group of mock jurors not presented with this
statistical evidence. See id. at 213-14 (breaking down study results by control group).
More importantly, the study found “little impact” on the jurors’ proclivity to convict
even when they possessed evidence of a laboratory error rate, suggesting a relatively
high potential for error in analysis and interpretation of the DNA samples, several
orders of magnitude higher than the random match probability. See id. at 214
(describing the low impact of providing the laboratory error rate to jurors).
Furthermore, juror misperceptions about the reliability of DNA evidence in
establishing a defendant’s guilt might be due, at least in part, to prosecutors’
arguments that the science behind DNA analysis renders it superior to fingerprint
evidence. See NRC I, supra note 45, at 161 (chiding attorneys who “oversell” DNA
evidence).
Prosecution experts, on the other hand, occasionally misstate or let
prosecutors misstate the import of their testimony—suggesting, for example,
that if a defendant’s DNA matches DNA collected at a crime scene and there
is a one in a million chance that a randomly selected person would have
matching DNA there is only a one in a million chance that someone other
than the defendant committed the crime. There are even cases where
prosecution experts have suggested that false positive error is impossible in
DNA analysis.
Lempert, supra note 134, at 441-42; see, e.g., People v. Fishback, 829 P.2d 489, 492
(Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (restating the prosecution expert’s testimony insisting the
DNA testing process used was “failsafe”); see also Jonathan J. Koehler, Error and
Exaggeration in the Presentation of DNA Evidence, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 21, 23 & n.8 (1993)
(listing further examples of misleading and inaccurate testimony by prosecution
expert witnesses regarding the reliability of DNA analysis).
180. See NRC I, supra note 45, at 157 (concluding that “as a personal identification
method, fingerprinting is the definitive forensic technique”).
Several facts
substantially support the assertion that fingerprinting is more reliable than DNA
evidence.
[Fingerprinting] has almost 100 years of development, which has established
empirically that a person has unique fingerprints; fingerprints can even
distinguish between twins. Fingerprints are easily detected and developed,
and large electronic fingerprint databases exist all over the world. A
fingerprint is a directly observable impression that does not generally involve
extensive chemical or biochemical manipulation. Rarely do fingerprint
experts differ in conclusions reached after examination of fingerprint
evidence.
Id.
181. See id. at 161 (clarifying that DNA identifications will not be as reliable as
fingerprinting “until technology and [DNA] databanks improve”).
182. See United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1932) (reasoning fingerprint
evidence is so conclusive that “[i]t can really be objected to only because it may
furnish strong evidence of a man’s guilt”).
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fingerprint and DNA evidence to distinguish between possible
sources proves misleading. As a general rule, fingerprints are more
conclusive and reliable in establishing a link between a sample and a
183
criminal suspect.
Researchers theoretically have the ability to
184
obtain and analyze all of the information fingerprints provide.
In
direct contrast, however, scientists examining DNA samples possess
the capability to analyze only one millionth of the three billion units
185
of human DNA. Though current DNA analysis capabilities lead to
186
conclusions about the source of a DNA sample, a great deal of
disagreement and inconsistency remains over the scope of DNA
analysis required to produce a result as conclusive as an examination
187
of fingerprint samples.
Third, although police routinely take fingerprints from a crime
183. See id. at 113 (finding that fingerprints can lead to a certain match, while
RFLP DNA analysis might require the examination of further loci not contained in
the database, following an initial match).
184. See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 26, at 6 (observing that with dermatoglyphic
fingerprints, unlike with DNA, “there are no missing pieces of information”).
185. See id. (clarifying that the comparison between DNA and fingerprints might
be more accurately represented through a description of DNA as a “partial
[finger]print” because it may not be necessary to have all DNA information to make
a positive identification).
186. See id. (noting that, as with partial latent fingerprint samples, scientists may
not require the full breadth of DNA’s information “to be convinced of the
individuality of a DNA profile”).
187. Compare id. (suggesting that an analysis of nine loci within a gene might be
sufficient to draw a conclusive inference that two DNA samples originated from the
same source), with Dr. Jennifer Smith, Remarks at the Meeting IX Proceedings of the
National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence, Comments Regarding R & D
Report (Apr. 9, 2000), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/dnamtgtrans9/trans-e.html
(last visited Oct. 17, 2000) (commenting on a suggestion to increase the standard
number of loci presently analyzed from 13 to 20, remarking, “I guess I would just
leave [the standard number of 13] alone, is what I’m saying, because we cannot get
anyone to say [the number required to conclusively establish a match is] 12 loci, it’s
13 loci, it’s ten loci, so to avoid numbers in general—we are doing—the community
is doing the best it can with the 13. It’s sometimes difficult to get everyone to do the
13.”). Dr. Smith, the manager of the DNA Analysis Unit for the FBI laboratory,
further revealed the disagreement over the number of loci that scientists should test
in remarking:
I would say right now it is as good as fingerprinting, personally. When I walk
into court and I testify this individual is the source of this DNA, to me that’s
the same as—if not better than a fingerprint in some instances . . . [But
scientists advocating an increase in the standard number of loci tested are]
saying [the accuracy of DNA typing] will get better and eventually it will be as
good as fingerprinting.
Id. The discussion between Dr. Smith and the members of the National Commission
reveals the difficulty and inconsistency in reaching a consensus regarding a standard
number of loci that the scientific community should employ before drawing
conclusions as to the identity of a DNA sample’s source. See generally id. (citing
comments with varying recommendations for a standard number of loci ranging all
the way from ten to fifty).
A “locus,” with respect to DNA testing, is “the specific physical location of a gene
on a chromosome.” See INMAN & RUDIN, supra note 26, at 168.
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scene, they collect DNA samples on a far less consistent basis. This
inconsistency in collection does not result from a lack of available
189
DNA evidence, as criminals—and especially rapists —almost always
190
Rather, police do not commonly
leave behind DNA samples.
191
collect DNA samples because such an effort is cost-prohibitive. This
inconsistency might result in a prejudicial inference, against a
criminal defendant, that the evidence or case is especially important
192
because investigators resorted to DNA profiling.
Additionally, the
failure to collect DNA evidence also leads to conclusory statements
that rhetorically, rather than scientifically, bolster the value of DNA
193
evidence.
DNA evidence warrants a further comparison with fingerprints by
virtue of the similarity in matching unknown samples with suspects of
194
known identity. In both instances, analysts compare portions (i.e., a
partial fingerprint from a specific finger or a locus of a specific gene)
of a sample from an unknown source with its known counterpart
(i.e., a print from the same finger or a profile of the same genetic
195
locus). Similarly, government officials store fingerprint samples as
196
well as genetic profiles from known sources in central repositories,
188. See NRC I, supra note 45, at 112 (declaring that police find latent fingerprints
more often than they find DNA-containing fluid samples).
189. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (delineating the scope of this
Comment, emphasizing the focus on rape and other sexual crimes).
190. See Diehl, supra note 35, at 432 (recognizing the frequency with which rapists
leave genetic samples at the crime scene).
191. See Tracy & Morgan, supra note 33, at 655 (concluding “it is doubtful” that
local law enforcement agencies have the resources to perform a full DNA
investigation at every crime scene); cf. NRC I, supra note 45, at 112 (indicating that
the cost of collecting DNA from every crime scene is prohibitive).
192. See NRC II, supra note 178, at 203 (implying laypersons, serving as triers of
fact, might be unduly influenced by the presentation of DNA evidence).
193. See NRC I, supra note 45, at 112 (contending that, “where it exists, DNA
evidence will often be more probative than fingerprints, in that the presence of body fluids
is harder to attribute to innocuous causes”) (emphasis added). The NRC I report
further indicated that “[t]hat is especially true in rape cases, in which positive
identification of semen in the vagina is virtual proof of intercourse (although it
leaves open the issue of whether it was consensual).” Id. Notably, the NRC I report
provided only a parenthetical reference to the issue of consent. This conclusory
assertion, albeit qualified, provides a prime example of a statement that might
unfairly influence the debate over DNA’s probative value.
194. See Asplen, supra note 40, at 148 (“DNA is similar to fingerprint analysis in
how the matches are determined.”); NRC I, supra note 45, at 24 (concluding that
techniques of DNA analysis are analogous to well-established forensic techniques,
including fingerprint examinations).
195. See Asplen, supra note 40, at 148 (comparing the objectively descriptive
factors of each type of evidence).
196. Compare NRC I, supra note 45, at 17-18 (discussing the impact of the
expansion of the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) central
fingerprint database in solving tens of thousands of additional crimes), with Tracy &
Morgan, supra note 33, at 642 (delineating the ideal process for searching a central
DNA database to match an unknown sample with an identifiable DNA source).
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thus allowing law enforcement agencies easy accessibility for
197
comparison.
Even though the methodologies for performing a screening are
similar, the disparity between the associated costs of each process
198
Aside from the cost of the relevant software,
remains significant.
199
fingerprint collection is inexpensive and efficient. In contrast, the
labor-intensive effort to analyze each DNA sample requires a
200
The higher financial
relatively substantial financial commitment.
burden of DNA analysis has produced an enormous backlog of DNA
samples awaiting analysis following their collection from crime
201
scenes.
DNA and fingerprint results share a common bond with respect to
the primary controversy over their use as evidence against defendants
at trial. The debate swirls not around the admissibility of the
202
evidence, but rather around the form of the expert testimony
203
Specifically with respect to DNA
introducing the evidence.
197. See NRC I, supra note 44, at 111 (explaining that with the development of the
AFIS fingerprint database, law enforcement officials now can compare an
unidentified latent fingerprint with millions of known patterns within minutes);
Tracy & Morgan, supra note 33, at 640-41 (elaborating on federal initiatives designed
to increase the efficiency and efficacy of DNA analysis in criminal investigations,
including the National DNA Index System (NDIS), which provides investigators with
an enhanced tool in violent crimes investigations by permitting law enforcement
agencies at all levels of government to submit DNA samples to a national database).
198. See NRC I, supra note 45, at 118 (“Ordinary fingerprint databanks have low
variable costs and high fixed costs, and DNA typing databanks have high variable
costs and comparatively low fixed costs.”).
199. See id. at 117 (revealing that the costs associated with collecting
dermatoglyphic prints are essentially limited to the cost of personnel time in taking
and filing the fingerprints).
200. See Tracy & Morgan, supra note 33, at 667 (using the industry rate of $50 per
test for a single DNA sample to estimate the cost of testing every federal inmate in
custody); NRC I, supra note 45, at 117 (calculating the cost of each component of the
analysis and concluding that RFLP DNA analysis costs approximately $100-150 per
sample).
201. See, e.g., Kim Kozlowski, Michigan Lags in Catching Rapists: Lack of Resources
Creates State Backlog in DNA Testing, DET. NEWS, May 30, 2000, at 1E (citing a National
Bureau of Justice statistic indicating that two-thirds of DNA laboratories across the
country possess backlogs of unanalyzed samples); LaTour, supra note 45, at B1
(reporting that New York police have insisted on reopening 12,000 unsolved rape
cases, each with DNA samples that require analysis); Senator Proposes DNA Indictments,
AP NEWSWIRES, June 5, 2000 (quoting a state legislator who indicated that the
backlog of unanalyzed DNA samples in the Michigan State Police crime laboratory
stands at 12,000 and 15,000 samples); Quach, supra note 121, at A4 (reporting
California’s backlog of at least 18,000 samples from rape cases alone).
202. See M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Fingerprints, Palm Prints, or Bare Footprints as
Evidence, 28 A.L.R. 2D 1115, 1130-31 (1953) (finding that fingerprint identification
results are so accurate that many courts have taken judicial notice of their reliability
and accuracy); Jonathan Greenberg, DNA Fingerprinting: A Guide for Defense Counsel,
1989 ARMY LAW. 16, 17 (observing that attacking the overall admissibility of DNA
evidence is not a worthwhile endeavor for defense counsel).
203. See M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Fingerprints, Palm Prints, or Bare Footprints as
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evidence, the scientific community has disagreed on the proper
standards for estimating the probability of a random match between a
criminal defendant and a DNA sample collected from a crime
204
scene.
In fact, in a span of fewer than five years, an expert
205
commission on the application of DNA technology to the legal
forum contradicted the conclusions drawn by its predecessor
206
commission
regarding the proper means of calculating such
207
probabilities.
Finally, DNA and fingerprint samples differ significantly in their
genesis and physical composition, an important factor carrying the
potential to significantly affect a defendant’s right to a fair trial
pursuant to a DNA indictment. Fingerprints derive their unique
characteristics from random events occurring during the embryonic
stage of human development—separate from genetic influence—
while the DNA’s individualizing characteristics derive from genetic
208
variation.
The difference has important implications for
distinguishing between twin siblings; because twins by definition have
209
the same genetic structure, their DNA is indistinguishable, yet
scientists have the ability to distinguish between identical twins on the
210
basis of their respective fingerprint patterns.
Aside from the possible unfairness of using genetic evidence
against a DNA indictee at trial, which this Comment addresses
Evidence, 28 A.L.R. 2D 1115, 1121 (1953) (announcing that the most contentious issue
regarding expert opinion on fingerprint evidence relates to the form in which the
expert must express the opinion, i.e., whether the expert may testify conclusively that
a suspect left the latent fingerprint sample); Kaye, supra note 70, at 168 (contending
that “the search for a procedure to convey—intelligibly, accurately and fairly—the
probative value of . . . [DNA] evidence has proved challenging”).
204. See Thompson, supra note 133, at 417 (criticizing the National Research
Council’s recommendations on the standards by which to measure probabilities of a
random match and suggesting alternative methods as more accurate and fair to a
criminal defendant).
205. See NRC II, supra note 178, at 49 (providing the commission’s task statement,
which generally charges NRC II with updating the NRC I report).
206. See NRC I, supra note 45, at vii-viii (describing the formation of NRC I).
207. See NRC II, supra note 178, at 49 (describing NRC II’s task statement as a
relatively vague charge). Although the NRC II task statement spoke mainly in
generalities, the statement notably emphasized the specific need to revamp the
National Research Council’s stance on the interpretation and explanation of
probability statistics. See id. “The committee . . . will also specifically rectify those
statements regarding statistical and population genetics issues in the previous report
that have been seriously misinterpreted or led to unintended procedures.” Id.
208. See NRC I, supra note 45, at 29, 31 (describing the differences between DNA
typing and dermatoglyphics).
209. See Rosenthal, supra note 57, at 197 (noting that identical twins have identical
genetic patterns).
210. See NRC I, supra note 45, at 29-30 (demonstrating that fingerprint forensics
depends on nongenetic physical manifestations and explaining that DNA relies
exclusively on genetic variation, which is absent in twin siblings).
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211

further in the speedy trial analysis, prosecutors’ reliance on DNA
evidence at the post-indictment arrest phase also threatens a suspect’s
rights. DNA indictments rely on a presumption of guilt after
obtaining a cold hit between a crime scene sample and a DNA
212
offender database sample.
This presumption threatens a person
identified by the cold hit because the search for additional suspects
213
usually ends at that time. By focusing their energies on the cold hit
suspect rather than continuing to exclude other possible sources of
the DNA, law enforcement officials risk overlooking the culpability of
equally probable suspects and ultimately prosecuting an innocent
214
individual.
Rather than accepting the DNA match as conclusive evidence of
the cold hit suspect’s guilt, one commentator suggests investigators
should expend additional resources to confirm that other persons
with similar genetic structures could not have been the source of the
215
even when circumstantial corroborating
crime scene sample,
216
evidence suggests the cold hit defendant’s guilt.
Thus, DNA
indictments based on genetic matches between a database and the
indictee only justify pursuit of the prosecution after an investigation
affirmatively excludes other potential sources of the crime scene
sample through testing of additional loci and consideration of non217
genetic (e.g., fingerprint) circumstantial evidence.
211. See infra Part IV.D (discussing the potential for DNA and its concomitant
evidentiary infirmities to impair an accused’s defense).
212. See, e.g., Barbara Ross et al., Indictment by DNA Genetics Get an Unknown Man
Charged as E. Side Rapist, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 16, 2000, at 7 (“All cops need [after
the DNA indictment] is a name to match with the [genetic] evidence, and they can
nail the rapist.”).
213. See Chaptman, supra note 139 (quoting a government official who remarked,
“if you’ve got the DNA, you know it’s the guy.”); Lempert, supra note 134, at 460
(“investigations typically stop when police think they have the culprit”).
214. See Lempert, supra note 134, at 461-62 (criticizing law enforcement’s failure
to consider all subjects within the relevant suspect pool in lieu of undue reliance on,
and confidence in, DNA samples matching at a particular number of loci). Lempert
considers a scenario in which “fairly suspected” persons with similar genetic
structures, such as close relatives, escape justice at the cost of an innocent person’s
liberty, because investigators discontinued the investigation into other suspects after
matching the crime scene sample with the DNA indictee’s sample. See id.
215. See id. at 456-57 (indicating a defendant’s random match probability of one
in 50 million does not rule out the possibility that the father, brothers, cousins, and
uncles with DNA matching the defendant’s at the relevant loci may have committed
the crime).
216. See id. at 460-61 (recommending police should extend their investigations
beyond relatives who are “plausible suspects,” even when eyewitness testimony
corroborates matching DNA results between the crime scene and the suspect).
217.
[Urging the state to] replace its random match statistic [between the crime
scene sample and the suspect] with a statistic showing the likelihood that at
least one named relative [named by the suspect as another possible source of
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Thus, despite the frequent comparisons between fingerprint and
DNA identification techniques, the differences between the two
suggest fingerprint evidence provides a more reliable method of
identifying suspects. This conclusion therefore begs a response as to
why prosecutors indict based on DNA but not on fingerprint
218
matches.
C. Why Haven’t Fingerprints Been Indicted?
To sustain an indictment or criminal information and the resulting
219
220
221
arrest warrant, the issuing body must find that probable cause
222
exists to believe the indictee committed the relevant crime. In the
case of DNA indictments, grand juries issue “John Doe”
223
indictments. Although courts have not yet ultimately ruled on the
224
logic dictates that “fingerprint
validity of DNA indictments,
225
indictments” would be at least as reliable—if not more so —than
the DNA] has DNA like the defendant’s unless the state excludes each
named relative through DNA testing [of additional loci] or exculpatory nonDNA evidence of a sort unlikely to implicate the relatives implicates the
defendant.
Id. at 461.
218. Although prosecutors indeed may have indicted fingerprints in the past, this
author’s research did not reveal any such instances.
219.
If it appears from the complaint, or from an affidavit or affidavits filed with
the complaint, that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the defendant has committed it, a warrant for the
arrest of the defendant shall issue to any officer authorized by law to execute
it.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a)
220. A grand jury issues indictments, while prosecutors independently charge
suspects through a criminal information. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5,
at 776, 783 (defining an indictment as a “formal written accusation of a crime, made
by a grand jury and presented to a court for prosecution against the accused person,”
and a criminal information as “[a] formal criminal charge made by a prosecutor
without a grand-jury indictment”).
221. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 9(a) (“Upon the request of the attorney for the
government the court shall issue a warrant for each defendant named in an
information supported by a showing of probable cause under oath as is required by
Rule 4(a), or in an indictment.”). A finding of probable cause requires “[a]
reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed . . . a crime . . . .” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1219. This standard “amounts to more than a bare
suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction.” Id.
222. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 615 N.E.2d 155, 162 (Mass. 1993)
(holding that the requirement of probable cause to issue an indictment “is justly
regarded as one of the securities to the innocent against hasty, malicious, and
oppressive public prosecutions”) (quoting Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray 329, 344 (1857)).
223. See Dedman, supra note 5, at A8 (defining “John Doe” indictments as the
vehicles through which DNA indictments take effect).
224. See Appellate Review, supra note 8 (reporting that a California appellate court
will issue a ruling on the validity of DNA indictments that may be appealed to the
California Supreme Court or even the U.S. Supreme Court).
225. See NRC I, supra note 45, at 157 (establishing fingerprint analysis as the most
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DNA indictments.
The presence of a person’s fingerprint at a crime scene does not
compel the conclusion that the person in all reasonable likelihood
226
committed the crime.
Although DNA indictments remain subject
to challenge on the grounds that they alone do not establish
probable cause, courts have consistently found that fingerprints alone
are sufficient to establish probable cause and, in some cases, even
227
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a suspect’s guilt. Even though
prosecutors ostensibly could indict on fingerprint evidence alone
with confidence they will satisfy the indictment’s probable cause
228
229
requirement, they have acted with restraint and declined to do so.
230
Prosecutors’ attempts to vindicate the rights of rape victims
indeed represent noble endeavors. Yet, if they continue to pursue
DNA indictments, they might find it difficult to refrain from pursuing
fingerprint indictments to vindicate the rights of victims of other
231
types of criminal activity.
Such a scenario essentially would

reliable form of forensic evidence).
226. See United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1932) (noting that a
fingerprint “is not in itself a badge of crime”).
227. See State v. Maya, 493 A.2d 1139, 1145 (N.H. 1985) (finding fingerprint
evidence sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant); Hughes v.
Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 861, 865 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (making a fact-specific
distinction between a previous case holding that fingerprint evidence alone failed to
establish probable cause to bind the defendant over for trial); People v. Thrower, 670
P.2d 1251, 1253 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (recognizing police officers only satisfied the
probable cause requirement to sustain a search warrant after they obtained
fingerprints linking defendant to the crime); People v. Summers, 426 N.E.2d 937,
940 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“[T]o sustain a conviction solely on fingerprint evidence,
fingerprints corresponding to the fingerprints of the defendant must have been
found in the immediate vicinity of the crime under such circumstances as to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that the fingerprints were impressed at the time the
crime was committed.” (quoting People v. Rhodes, 422 N.E.2d 605, 608 (Ill. 1981),
rev’g People v. Van Zant, 405 N.E.2d 881 (Ill. 1980))); State v. Helms, 12 S.E.2d 243,
245 (N.C. 1940) (holding that fingerprint evidence matching the defendant’s taken
from a windowsill in a breaking and entering case was “properly admitted” and
“sufficient to take the case to the jury”); People v. Les, 255 N.W. 407, 408-10 (Mich.
1934) (ruling the discovery of the defendant’s palm print on a window sill through
which an intruder unlawfully gained access to the home sufficiently established
probable cause to link the defendant to the crime).
228. See id.
229. It is possible that prosecutors, prior to DNA indictments, did not conceive of
the idea of indicting fingerprints. However, prosecutors have not chosen to pursue
this means of law enforcement despite widespread media attention of DNA
indictments. See supra note 218 (suggesting prosecutors have never attempted a
fingerprint indictment); see also supra note 12 (listing media reports describing DNA
indictments).
230. See Unknown Man, supra note 4 (indicating prosecutors owe a duty to rape
victims to pursue every means possible of bringing the attacker to justice).
231. See Kravets, supra note 6 (quoting Johnny Griffin III, Paul Robinson’s
attorney, claiming prosecutors will “start doing it for everything” if courts uphold
DNA indictments).
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obliterate the statute of limitations for any crime resulting in DNA or
232
fingerprint evidence.
In essence, the legal justice system could
transform overnight from an institution designed to protect the
233
innocent
to a system that places more value on winning
convictions—with potentially disastrous implications for innocent
bystanders who had the misfortune to leave their DNA or fingerprints
at a place that subsequently turned into a crime scene.
IV. HISTORICAL AND MODERN APPLICATION OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL
CLAUSE
If the courts uphold DNA and fingerprint indictments in spite of
234
their inconsistency with the policy underlying statutes of limitations,
defendants ultimately might rely on the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy
235
Trial clause as a last resort to protect their rights. The following
analysis examines the historical development and purpose of the
clause, leading to provocative questions about the constitutionality of
DNA indictments. The section concludes by extrapolating existing
precedent and suggesting an analysis courts should employ in
assessing the constitutionality of DNA indictments with respect to the
speedy trial provision.
A. History of the Speedy Trial Clause
The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part, “in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
236
trial . . . .” As with the statute of limitations, the Speedy Trial Clause
237
The earliest evidence of a similar right
derives from English law.
238
comes from the Assize of Clarendon in 1166.
The most formal
232. See id. (quoting Griffin saying, “there will be no statute of limitations” and
implying “the criminal justice system would be turned on its head” if courts validate
DNA indictments).
233. See Neuendorf, supra note 104, at 144 (recognizing the special protections
afforded criminal defendants through a very high prosecutorial burden of proof).
234. See supra Part II.D (arguing DNA indictments undermine the policies
justifying statutes of limitations).
235. See Adlestein, supra note 67, at 263-67 (arguing courts should have greater
discretion in applying statutes of limitations because the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy
Trial clause ultimately provides relief for defendants aggrieved by stale evidence and
an inability to fairly present a vigorous defense).
236. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
237. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967) (tracing the
development of the speedy trial guarantee in American courts, finding their genesis
in the “English law heritage”).
238. See Ronna A. Laidley, Note, The Filing of an Indictment Against a Criminal
Defendant Activates His Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial, Notwithstanding the Fact
that the Defendant Had No Knowledge of the Indictment Until the Time of His Arrest, 24 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 595, 597 (1993) (tracing the history of the Speedy Trial clause).
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historical articulation of the clause, however, appeared in the Magna
239
Carta in 1215.
At an early date, Sir Edward Coke recognized the importance of
240
providing a speedy trial to defendants detained in custody. He
241
commended the traveling justices for meting out speedy justice.
Coke viewed the Magna Carta as “one of the fundamental bases of
242
As a result of Coke’s substantial influence, his
English liberty.”
243
opinions had a significant impact on American colonists.
Virginia’s Bill of Rights, the first among the colonies, revealed
deference to Coke’s writings by borrowing heavily from the Magna
244
Several of the other colonies followed Virginia’s lead by
Carta.
enacting similar provisions within their respective state
245
constitutions. Although few documents record the adoption of the
246
Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the speedy trial guarantee in Virginia’s Declaration
of Rights of 1776 provided the foundation for the Sixth
247
Amendment. In addition to the federal guarantee to a speedy trial,
each of the fifty states provides a similar guarantee to those within its

239. Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 223 (“We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to
any man either justice or right”) (quoting MAGNA CARTA, c. 29 (c. 40 of King John’s
Charter of 1215 (1225)), translated and quoted in COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 45 (Brooke, 5th ed., 1797)).
240. See Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 223-24 (citing the writings of Coke, which emphasized
the detainee’s liberty interests).
241. See id. at 224 (quoting Coke as saying that the justices “have not suffered the
prisoner to be long detained, but at their next coming have given the prisoner full
and speedy justice . . . without detaining him long in prison”).
242. Id. at 225.
243. See Daniel A. Conforti, Note, Doggett v. United States: Breathing New Life Into
the Right to a Speedy Trial, 21 W. ST. U. L. REV. 619, 619-20 (1994) (discussing the
influence of Coke’s writings on Thomas Jefferson and John Rutledge); see also Klopfer,
386 U.S. at 225 (recognizing that Coke’s writings were the standard course of study
for students of the law at that time).
244. See Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 225 (explaining that the Virginia Declaration of Rights
of 1776, as drafted by George Mason, stated that “a man hath a right . . . to a speedy
trial . . . .”).
245. See id. at 225 n.21 (listing Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and
Massachusetts, and noting that Kentucky, Tennessee, and Vermont also adopted
speedy trial guarantees upon their admission to the Union during the eighteenth
century).
246. See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 41 n.2 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(stating “[r]ecords of the intent of [the Speedy Trial Clause’s] Framers are sparse,”
but noting the Framers appeared to have assigned the Clause the same value it
received in the English common law); Laidley, supra note 238, at 611 n.85
(indicating that the records reveal only one passage where the First Congress
considered the Speedy Trial clause, despite copious debate on the other Bill of
Rights proposals).
247. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 314 n.6 (1971) (reasoning that
James Madison probably relied on the Virginia Declaration of Rights as a “model” for
drafting the Sixth Amendment).
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248

jurisdiction.

B. Rationale Justifying the Speedy Trial Clause
Commentators generally agree the Speedy Trial Clause protects
three distinct interests: (1) to avoid protracted pre-trial detention of
249
the defendant; (2) to avoid the anxiety and embarrassment of
250
public accusation of a crime; and (3) to minimize the prejudice to a
defendant’s ability to defend himself by pressing the charges before
251
evidence deteriorates and memories fade. These three interests do
not exhaust all the reasons behind the Speedy Trial Clause, but
rather account for the most important and oft-cited purposes
252
advanced to justify this constitutional guarantee. All three of these
interests are designed to protect the rights of the accused in a
253
criminal prosecution.
First, the Speedy Trial Clause protects a criminal defendant’s
personal liberty interests by compelling the Government to dispose of
254
Of the three reasons justifying the
his case as soon as possible.
Speedy Trial Clause, this rationale holds the strongest basis in
255
historical context.
248. See Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 226 (emphasizing that the right is considered
fundamental); see also Laidley, supra note 238, at 598 n.19 (indicating that every state
except New York, Nevada and North Carolina has incorporated the right to a speedy
trial into its state constitution).
249. See STEVEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
998 (West 6th ed. 2000) (providing a brief overview of the history leading to modernday application of the Speedy Trial clause).
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. See, e.g., Laidley, supra note 238, at 599-600 (claiming that the Clause also
protects societal interests such as the “desire to reduce the possibility that the
accused will commit further crimes” while awaiting prosecution).
253. See Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905) (declaring that the Speedy
Trial clause “secures rights to a defendant”).
254. See United States v. Levine, 658 F.2d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 1981) (maintaining
that the rationale of the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial guarantee overlaps with that
of limiting statutes because they both primarily protect the interests of defendants,
but also simultaneously protect society from unincarcerated offenders and provide
relief to prosecutors who might otherwise be required to press claims so old they
would inhibit the government’s capacity to bring the case).
255. See Brian P. Brooks, Note, A New Speedy Trial Standard for Barker v. Wingo:
Reviving a Constitutional Remedy In An Age of Statutes, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 597
(1994) (“The Sixth Amendment was adopted against a backdrop of English and early
colonial practice in which criminal prosecutions had been conducted with
‘unfairness,’ ‘brutality,’ and the ‘savage satisfaction’ of the courts in their oftexercised power of life and death over criminal defendants.”) (quoting FRANCIS H.
HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 13 (1951)); Conforti, supra note 243, at 634 (arguing
that “historical precedent” requires that the defendant’s liberty interests are
implicated before the speedy trial guarantee attaches); Laidley, supra note 238, at
611-12 (suggesting there is an “historical mandate” in the Speedy Trial Clause’s
protection of personal liberty); see also United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 197 (D.
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The second interest advanced in support of the speedy trial
256
guarantee is less tangible than the first.
The courts have
consistently referred to this interest as the defendant’s right to
257
minimize “public obloquy.” The goal of this interest is to reduce, to
the extent possible, the anxiety, embarrassment, and suspicion that
258
are inherent when a person is publicly accused of criminal activity.
The third interest, protecting a defendant from stale claims,
overlaps to a great extent with the rationale supporting statutes of
259
limitations.
This purpose does not find support in the historical
evolution of the right to a speedy trial, as courts independently have
developed and adopted the reason as fundamental to an
260
understanding of the speedy trial right. Their interpretation lies at
the heart of the analysis in this Comment.
C. Judicial Interpretation and Application
The constitutionality of DNA indictments, in light of the Sixth
Amendment’s Speedy Trial clause, likely will be challenged in the
261
near future. The following discussion suggests that the difficulty in
anticipating the Supreme Court’s ruling on the subject derives, at
least partially, from the Court’s inconsistent application of the Speedy
Trial Clause.
262
Prior to 1967, the Supreme Court had given “scant attention” to
the Speedy Trial Clause. Until that time, the Court had considered
only three cases directly addressing the constitutional right to a

Md.), aff’d, 380 U.S. 857 (1955) (determining the speedy trial guarantees in the
earliest American provisions were designed to protect defendants against undue
incarceration based on the fact that these American provisions borrowed heavily, if
not verbatim, from the British Habeas Corpus Act of 1679).
256. See Brooks, supra note 255, at 587 (recognizing that the basis for the speedy
trial guarantee is “slippery” and “amorphous”) (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514, 522 (1972)).
257. See, e.g., United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971). “Obloquy” is
“[t]he state or condition of being ill spoken of; disgrace or bad repute.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1104.
258. See Neuendorf, supra note 104, at 144 (stressing that “the stigmatism that goes
along with the assertion of something as serious as sexual abuse has a very damaging
effect”); Brooks, supra note 255, at 596-98 (analyzing the three interests protected by
the Speedy Trial Clause).
259. See supra Part II.B (analyzing the reasons giving rise to the statute of
limitations).
260. See Brooks, supra note 255, at 597 (arguing that this reasoning “was not as
central to the original understanding of the Sixth Amendment,” but recognizing that
modern judicial analysis has afforded it the most attention of the three interests).
261. See Kravets, supra note 6 (suggesting Paul Robinson’s case and similar cases in
the future might find final adjudication in the Unites States Supreme Court).
262. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 40 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(cataloguing the historical development of the Sixth Amendment).
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263

speedy trial.
The legal protections afforded to defendants
remained so slight that in 1975, Congress deemed it necessary to
264
codify a statutory version of the speedy trial guarantee to give force
265
to the constitutional right. In fact, the relative dearth of Supreme
Court precedent on this topic may be due, in part, to the
266
preclusionary effect of the more stringent statutory provisions.
Beginning with the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Ewell,267 however, the Speedy Trial Clause began to take on far more
significance than previously accorded. For the first time, the Court
268
delineated the three protections
the constitutional provision
269
protects.
The following year, the Court decided another speedy
270
trial case, Klopfer v. North Carolina, explicitly stating that “the right to
a speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the
271
The Court underscored its newfound
Sixth Amendment.”
fascination with the Speedy Trial Clause by announcing the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial applies to the states through the
272
Fourteenth Amendment.
In Klopfer, the Court justified its
273
decision by examining the personal liberty and public obloquy
rationales, without considering the potential evidentiary prejudice to
263. See id. (attempting to define more specifically the concrete rights guaranteed
by the Speedy Trial Clause by analyzing its historical context).
264. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2000) (delineating time limits and exclusions to ensure
a speedy trial for a defendant).
265. See United States v. Bullock, 551 F.2d 1377, 1380-81 (5th Cir. 1977)
(comparing the Act’s legislative intent “to implement the Sixth Amendment’s goal of
insuring that those who are accused of crime are brought speedily to trial” with the
purpose for a similar local court rule).
266. See United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 304 n.1 (1986) (“The more
stringent provisions of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., have mooted
much litigation about the requirements of the Speedy Trial Clause as applied to
federal prosecutions.”). Note, however, that the statutory Speedy Trial Act was not
enacted until January 3, 1975, and thus cannot account for the Clause’s lack of
judicial priority prior to that date. See Bullock, 551 F.2d at 1380 (providing the
historical context of the Speedy Trial Act).
267. 383 U.S. 116 (1966).
268. See supra Part III.B (articulating that the Speedy Trial Clause protects a
defendant’s interests in avoiding excessive pre-trial incarceration, avoiding public
obloquy, and avoiding the prejudice of defending against stale claims).
269. See Ewell, 383 U.S. at 120 (reiterating that the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy
Trial Clause attempts to prevent unnecessary incarceration prior to trial, minimize
anxiety related to public accusation, and limit the possibility that a long delay will
hinder an accused’s ability to defend himself).
270. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
271. Id. at 223.
272. See id. at 222-23 (indicating that previous cases “declaring that the Sixth
Amendment does not apply to the States can no longer be regarded as the law”).
273. The Court held that the state had violated a criminal defendant’s speedy trial
guarantee when it entered a “nolle prosequi with leave” against the defendant,
indefinitely postponing the prosecution but simultaneously vesting the prosecutor
with the right to reinstate charges against the defendant at any time in the future. Id.
at 214.
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274

a defendant’s case.
Since 1967, the Court’s decisions have reflected an internal
disagreement over the importance of potential prejudice to a
275
defendant in speedy trial analysis. With the precedent in apparent
conflict, the Court took the opportunity to clarify its speedy trial
276
doctrine in Barker v. Wingo in 1972. Barker involved a defendant’s
appeal from a murder conviction on speedy trial grounds after
sixteen postponements of his trial date throughout the five years
277
following his arrest. Notably, however, Barker did not object to the
first eleven continuances, and only asserted his speedy trial right on
278
279
The Court’s opinion marked a
the day his trial began in 1963.
274. See Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 221-22 (emphasizing the “limitations placed upon [the
defendant’s] liberty” and the “public scorn” that the defendant might suffer while
the defendant remained under indictment).
275. In Dickey v. Florida, the next major Speedy Trial Clause case decided three
years after Klopfer, the Court considered only the potential prejudice to the
defendant’s case. See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 37-38 (1970). Although, in
fairness, the facts of this case did not directly implicate the personal liberty and
public obloquy interests, they were not irrelevant. See id. at 32, 34 (relating the facts
of the case). The defendant was incarcerated in a federal institution when the state
of Florida sought a writ of detainer against him in 1960, and thus was not subject to
pre-trial detention in connection with the state charge of armed robbery.
Furthermore, the defendant was not formally charged by the state until December of
1967, shortly before his January 1968 release from federal prison. Id. at 34. But see
id. at 41-42 (Brennan, J., concurring) (applying all three interests discussed in Ewell
and Klopfer, including the potential prejudice factor, to the present case).
Just a year later, however, the Court’s interpretation of the interests protected by
the Speedy Trial Clause emphatically changed again with its decision in United States
v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971). In Marion, the Court rejected—without discussion—
the reasoning of Dickey and its predecessors, writing “the major evils protected
against by the speedy trial guarantee exist quite apart from actual or possible
prejudice to an accused’s defense.” See Marion, 404 U.S. at 320 (citing Ewell and
Klopfer for the proposition that the Speedy Trial Clause only protects the defendant’s
interest in minimizing undue pre-trial incarceration and public obloquy). To
support this new interpretation, the Court emphasized “[t]he law has provided other
mechanisms to guard against . . . prejudice resulting from the passage of time
between crime and arrest or charge,” namely the statutes of limitations. Id. at 322-23.
See also United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982) (“The Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial is thus not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the
defense caused by passage of time; that interest is protected primarily by the Due
Process Clause and by statutes of limitations.”). But see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514, 532 (1972) (intimating the importance of determining the possible impairment
of an accused’s defense by recognizing an unquantifiable prejudice due to lost
witnesses or fading memories); Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 661-62 (1992)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the prevention of prejudice to a defendant
as “an independent and fundamental objective of the Speedy Trial Clause”). In
Doggett, Justice Scalia also found the Court’s one-sentence attempt to harmonize the
apparent conflict in the cases to be “eminently unpersuasive.” Id. at 662.
276. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
277. See id. at 517-18 (tracing the procedural posture of the case from 1958
through 1963).
278. See id. (delineating the reasons for the postponements).
279. Justice Powell wrote for the 7-member majority opinion, while Justice
Brennan joined Justice White’s concurring opinion. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 536.
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departure from the Sixth Amendment’s historical protection of the
280
rights of criminal defendants by declaring the speedy trial right also
281
protects a societal interest distinct from the rights of the defendant.
282
After noting the deficiencies of alternative proposals, the Court
enunciated a new four-part balancing test to determine whether a
prosecution has violated a defendant’s speedy trial rights. Instead of
exclusively focusing on the defendant’s interests, the test additionally
283
considers (1) “society[’s] interest in bringing swift prosecutions,” by
examining the length of delay between indictment, arrest and trial,
284
(2) the validity of the government’s reason for the delay, (3) the
285
defendant’s delay in asserting his right, and (4) prejudice to the
286
defendant. Despite the discussion about the importance of societal
rights, the Court explicitly declared that the interest in minimizing
287
prejudice to the defendant is the “most serious” of the four factors
because the integrity of the legal system of justice depends on an
288
accused’s ability to defend against criminal claims.
Although the new Barker test finally provided a relatively concrete
guideline by which to measure the defendant’s rights, subsequent
decisions revealed a continuing conflict over whether the Sixth
Amendment should be applied to vindicate a defendant’s interest in
289
minimizing prejudice to his case. Most recently, in Doggett v. United
280. See Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905) (indicating the speedy trial
right accrues to criminal defendants).
281. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 519 (insisting the Speedy Trial Clause protects societal
interests “separate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused”).
The Court also may have attempted to retrospectively justify its decision in Marion by
indicating that an extensive pre-trial delay does not “per se” prejudice a defendant,
as fading memories may also prejudice the prosecution’s case. Id. at 521.
282. See id. at 523-26 (declining to set a strict time limit by which cases must go to
trial and rejecting the “demand-waiver” doctrine). The Court felt it would invade the
province of the legislative branch by setting a “rigid” deadline. Id. at 523. The Court
also considered the “demand-waiver” doctrine, which “provides that a defendant
waives any consideration of his right to speedy trial for any period prior to which he
has not demanded a trial.” Id. at 525. This doctrine seemed unreasonable and failed
to harmonize with existing precedent protecting rights similar to those preserved by
the Speedy Trial Clause. Id. at 525-26 (finding the demand-waiver doctrine “is not
consistent with the interests of defendants, society, or the Constitution.”).
283. Barker, 407 U.S. at 527.
284. See id. at 531 (acknowledging the subtle distinction between this interest and
the length of the delay factor).
285. See id. at 528-29 (finding the defendant’s “assertion of or failure to assert”
distinction to be more consistent with constitutional development).
286. See id. at 532 (defining this factor in terms of the historical development that
gave rise to the Speedy Trial Clause).
287. In articulating the evils that an emphasis on prejudice seeks to counter, the
Court defined this right in terms of the defendant’s interest in the three traditional
reasons advanced to justify the Speedy Trial Clause. See supra Part IV.B.
288. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 (“[T]he inability of a defendant adequately to
prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.”).
289. See, e.g., United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 (1986) (concluding
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States290 the Court again sullied the clarity of the Speedy Trial Clause
waters by reviving the significance it attached to prejudice against the
291
defendant in the earlier Dickey v. Florida opinion.
In Doggett, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents attempted to
arrest the defendant, Marc Doggett, at his residence in 1980 after a
federal grand jury indicted him for conspiring to import and
292
distribute cocaine.
Doggett, however, had left for Colombia,
without any knowledge of the indictment, by the time agents reached
293
his residence.
The agents subsequently entered Doggett’s name
into several national databases and notified Customs officials of the
294
In 1981, agents learned Doggett was
outstanding arrest warrant.
facing drug charges in Panama, but their failure to secure his
295
Doggett
extradition allowed Doggett to return to Colombia.
returned to the United States in 1982, passing through Customs
296
without any problems, and settled into an otherwise productive and
297
The DEA agents assigned to the case failed to
law-abiding life.
298
actively pursue Doggett or inquire into his location, allowing him to
live freely until a routine credit check performed by the U.S.
Marshal’s Service in 1988 finally helped police locate Doggett and
299
execute his outstanding arrest warrant.
that potential impairment of a fair trial caused by lost witnesses or fading memories
“is not sufficient to support respondents’ position that their speedy trial rights were
violated”); United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977) (noting that “statutes
of limitations . . . provide ‘the primary guarantee against bringing overly stale
criminal charges’”) (quoting Ewell, 383 U.S. at 122); United States v. MacDonald, 456
U.S. 1, 7-8 (1982) (citing Marion to emphasize the significance of the pre-trial
incarceration factor, and noting that statutes of limitations and the Due Process
Clause are the primary forms of protection against prejudice to the defendant).
290. 505 U.S. 647 (1992).
291. See supra note 275 (arguing that the Dickey Court’s only concern rested with
the defendant’s interest in minimizing prejudice).
292. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 648-50 (reiterating the facts of the case).
293. See id. at 649 (relating that Doggett’s mother informed DEA agents he had
left four days prior to the agents’ arrival).
294. See id. (indicating DEA agents placed Doggett’s name into the Treasury
Enforcement Communication System and the National Crime Information Center
databases, both of which assist Customs agents to effect outstanding arrest warrants
when the subjects of the warrants attempt to re-enter the United States).
295. See id. (revealing the DEA agents informally requested that Panamanian
officials “expel” Doggett to the United States because they believed a formal
extradition request would be a waste of time).
296. See id. (explaining that Customs officials did not apprehend Doggett because
his name had expired from the Customs database in 1980).
297. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 649 (insinuating Doggett’s actions did not imply he
actively evaded capture because he “married, earned a college degree, found a steady
job as a computer operations manager, lived openly under his own name, and stayed
within the law”).
298. See id. at 649-50 (implying that officials could have located Doggett at a much
earlier point in time if they had taken basic steps to follow up on the case).
299. See id. at 650 (emphasizing the ease with which the Marshal’s Service
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In applying the Barker four-factor balancing test to Doggett, the
Court placed a strong emphasis on the fact that the government
could not justify the reason for the eight and a half year delay in
300
pursuing the defendant’s case. However, the Court also indirectly
created an irrefutable presumption of prejudice to the defendant’s
case, to be weighed against the government, when the defendant
301
makes a showing of an “extraordinary” delay in prosecution. In so
doing, the Court essentially made it easier for defendants to tip the
Barker balance in favor of defendants.
302

D. Applying Barker/Doggett to DNA Indictments

The practice of DNA indictment raises several questions of
constitutional significance in light of the Court’s interpretation of the
Speedy Trial Clause throughout the past thirty years. Because DNA
indictments are designed to defeat the relevant statute of
303
limitations, the prosecution presumes the delay between indictment
304
A speedy trial defense for a DNA
and trial will be substantial.
determined Doggett’s residence and place of employment).
300. See id. at 657 (noting that the Government’s “egregious persistence in failing
to prosecute” the defendant was “clearly sufficient” to justify granting relief to the
defendant).
301. See Steven M. Wernikoff, Extending Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Protection to
Defendants Unaware of Their Indictments: Doggett v. United States, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 804, 826-29 (1993) (asserting that the Court’s failure to define even
broad parameters for the term “extraordinary delay,” combined with the absence of
any guidelines or suggestions as to how the prosecution could possibly rebut a
defendant’s claim of prejudice, places a “heightened burden” on the prosecution to
limit post-indictment delay).
302. The following discussion presumes a case of DNA indictment with
circumstances similar to those of Mr. Robinson’s case. See Kravets, supra note 6
(relating the facts of the case). In other words, the analysis assumes a DNA
indictment resulting in the arrest of a defendant, following a cold hit against a DNA
databank, all occurring after the statute of limitations otherwise would have expired.
303. See Doege, Another Rapist, supra note 20, at 7 (revealing the impetus behind
the decision to indict the DNA rested with the prosecutor’s desire to retain
jurisdiction over the case).
304. See Adelstein, supra note 67, at 251 n.228 (indicating most state statutes set
the time during which a prosecution may commence at three years for felony
offenses). If the prosecutors practicing DNA indictment felt confident they could
file charges against a named defendant prior to the expiration of the statutory
period, they would have no reason to seek DNA indictments. It appears prosecutors,
therefore, have committed themselves to bringing untimely prosecutions many,
many years after the relevant statute of limitations expired. See, e.g., Senator Proposes
DNA Indictments, AP NEWSWIRE, June 5, 2000 (quoting a prosecutor indicating he will
pursue cases against DNA indictees “no matter how long it takes to track the suspect
down”).
The circumstances will not always involve a lengthy period between indictment
and arrest, however. In California, Paul Robinson’s arrest warrant for rape was
issued just prior to the statutory deadline. See Kravets, supra note 6 (observing that
prosecutors pursued the warrant the day before the statutory deadline would have
expired). The defendant was arrested shortly after the warrant was issued. See id.
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indictee should offer a great deal of protection, especially in light of
the Court’s creation of an irrefutable presumption of prejudice to the
305
defendant who establishes that an “extraordinary delay” took place
306
between indictment and arrest. The following discussion examines
some important constitutional questions implicated by DNA
indictments and attempts to harmonize the practice with the
articulated objective of protecting defendants from the prejudice
caused by a delayed prosecution.
As a preliminary matter, a doubt remains as to whether a
defendant implicated by a DNA indictment retains the right to raise a
speedy trial defense. The Sixth Amendment provides that “the
307
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial . . . .”
The
Supreme Court has construed this clause to require either the arrest
or the filing of a formal indictment or criminal information before
308
the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial attaches. Yet the Court
has construed the Sixth Amendment as applicable only to “persons,”
309
which do not necessarily include samples of genetic material.
The underlying rationale for this policy acknowledges that a
defendant’s arrest is a public act that restricts his personal liberty and
310
subjects him to suspicion and embarrassment in the community.
The practice of DNA indictment occurs, by definition, when the
identity of the defendant is known neither to law enforcement
311
agencies nor the public at large. Therefore, the defendant is at no
(hailing DNA evidence for revealing an identity that investigators had fruitlessly
pursued for six years).
305. See Wernikoff, supra note 301, at 826-29 (explaining how the Court’s failure
to illustrate the possibility of rebutting a defendant’s claim of prejudice leads, de
facto, to a finding of presumptive harm to the defendant’s case).
306. See Adelstein, supra note 67, at 263-67 (implying the Sixth Amendment
remains the ultimate protection for defendants who might otherwise be prejudiced
by an inequitable application of the statute of limitations, but suggesting a flexible,
non-constitutional approach could be developed to “weigh the actual prejudice
caused by unjustifiable delay against the reasons for such delay” to protect societal
interests).
307. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
308. See Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975) (per curiam) (holding
that a delay of twenty-two months between arrest and indictment on automobile theft
charges violated the Speedy Trial Clause because the defendant is considered
“accused” at the time of his arrest, even though the formal indictment occurred at a
much later time) (citing to Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1971)).
309. See Marion, 404 U.S. at 313 (“[T]he protection of the Amendment is activated
only when a criminal prosecution has commenced and extends only to those persons
who have been ‘accused’ in the course of that prosecution.”) (emphasis added).
310. See Dillingham, 423 U.S. at 65 (“Arrest is a public act that may seriously
interfere with the defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may
disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject
him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends.”)
(quoting Marion, 404 U.S. at 320-21).
311. See Dedman, supra note 5, at A8 (explaining that prosecutors must file each
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risk of suffering from restrictions on his liberty or public humiliation
312
because the charge is filed in the form of a “John Doe” indictment.
If, however, the courts find a DNA indictment sufficiently describes a
313
314
as DNA indictment proponents suggest,
only an
person,
unreasonably hypertechnical reading of precedent would preclude
315
application of the speedy trial provision on these grounds.
Assuming arguendo that the Court will not dismiss such a defense as
facially insufficient, many additional questions remain after Doggett
regarding the constitutionality of DNA indictments. The pivotal
question depends on whether the Sixth Amendment protects
defendants against prejudice due to lost or faded evidence, or
whether that duty lies within the primary province of the statute of
limitations.
Beyond Doggett: Application of the Barker test to DNA indictment
316
The Court’s conflicting precedent in addressing this question
offers no easy answers in the case of DNA indictments. For this
reason, the following analysis raises some of the difficult questions
that DNA indictment provokes and attempts to extrapolate the
Court’s reasoning to the current scenario. The section concludes
with recommendations that courts should entertain upon examining
DNA indictments in light of the Speedy Trial Clause.

1.

charge as a “John Doe” indictment or warrant because authorities remain unaware of
the suspect’s identity).
312. See Charges, supra note 5 (using genetic markings to provide the description of
the suspect instead of phenotypical physical features).
313. See generally People v. Montoya, 255 Cal. App. 2d 137, 142-43 (1967) (holding
that a warrant containing a fictitious name must describe the suspect with such
reasonable particularity to allow the arrest of the suspect based on the warrant’s
description).
314. See Austin Rape, supra note 12 (quoting a prosecutor in the District Attorney’s
office as saying, “You might not know the name, but there’s only one person on this
Earth that has this marker”); see also Eric Slater, Rape Case Tests the Limits: Milwaukee
Uses Genetic Evidence to File Warrants in Unsolved Crimes, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000, at A1
(relating Norman Gahn’s words: “We know exactly who these rapists are. We just
don’t know their names”).
315. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992) (implying the Sixth
Amendment must be interpreted liberally because a purely literal reading of the
words of the Amendment otherwise would preclude prosecutors from delaying a
defendant’s trial, regardless of the circumstances); United States v. MacDonald, 456
U.S. 1, 15 (1982) (employing a “natural reading” of the text of the Speedy Trial
Clause).
316. See supra note 275 (reflecting the Court’s internal dispute over how much
emphasis to place on the defendant’s interest in avoiding prejudice).
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Length of delay

In assessing the length-of-delay factor, the Supreme Court has
recognized a one-year delay between accusation and trial presents a
presumption of prejudice to the defendant sufficient to trigger a
Barker analysis.317 The Court thereby shifted the burden to the
318
prosecution to rebut the presumptive prejudice.
In Doggett,
319
however, the Court found an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice
320
due to “extraordinary” delays, without defining which factors cause
an extraordinary delay and without distinguishing an extraordinary
321
from a regular delay.
322
A simple examination of the length of delay involved in Barker
323
and Doggett leads to the conclusion that a delay lasting longer than
324
five years, i.e., longer generally than most limiting statutes, qualifies
as extraordinary and thereby presents an irrebuttable presumption of
prejudice against a criminal defendant. Although the foregoing
conclusion appears to establish unequivocally that DNA indictments
presumptively prejudice defendants’ cases, two factors deserve
consideration on this issue. First, the relevant time frame involved in
speedy trial analysis is the period between accusation (or arrest) and
325
trial.
Because prosecutors have artificially manipulated the
317. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651-52 & n.1 (declaring that a “presumptively
prejudicial” delay “does not necessarily indicate a statistical probability of prejudice;
it simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to
trigger the Barker enquiry”) (citation omitted).
318. See Wernikoff, supra note 301, at 828 (criticizing the Court for failing to offer
guidelines suggesting a means through which the government might rebut the
presumption of prejudice).
319. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657-58 (focusing entirely on the rights of the
defendant, without offering any hint to the government how they could have
responded to the defendant’s Speedy Trial claim).
320. See id. at 658 (implying that an eight and a half year delay was “extraordinary”
in saying “we have called shorter delays ‘extraordinary’”); see also Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972) (“It is clear that the length of delay between arrest and
trial—well over five years—was extraordinary.”).
321. See Wernikoff, supra note 301, at 826 (suggesting that the existence of an
extraordinary, as opposed to a regular, delay “greatly affects which party has the
burden of showing the existence of prejudice”).
322. The delay was greater than five years. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 517-19 (tracing
the delay from 1958 through to 1963, when Barker finally went to trial).
323. The delay was eight and a half years between Doggett’s indictment and his
arrest. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 (finding the eight and a half year delay sufficient
to trigger a Barker analysis).
324. See Adelstein, supra note 67, at 251 n.228 (indicating most state statutes set
three years as the time beyond which a felony prosecution may not commence for
felony offenses).
325. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971) (announcing the
Supreme Court’s opinion that “the Sixth Amendment speedy trial provision has no
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326

indictment process,
they in effect prohibit defendants from
invoking their Sixth Amendment rights until the statute of limitations
327
has expired.
When prosecutors indict DNA immediately prior to
the expiration of the limitations period, they deprive defendants of
statutory rights and may also preclude an invocation of constitutional
328
rights.
Second, the Court allows subjective interpretations to control
whether the length of the delay is sufficient to trigger a Barker
329
analysis.
By way of example, the Court recommended trial courts
consider the nature of the criminal activity, suggesting they should
330
Leaving this
tolerate longer delays for more “serious” crimes.
decision to subjective determination creates the danger judges will
focus on the emotionally compelling account of a rape victim to
331
determine the severity of the crime’s effect.
Lower courts should
application until the putative defendant in some way becomes an ‘accused,’” which
can occur through indictment, arrest, or the filing of a criminal information against
a suspect).
326. See Slater, supra note 314, at A1 (reporting an instance in which the Assistant
District Attorney filed a DNA indictment only eight hours before the statute of
limitations would have expired); see also Kravets, supra note 6 (revealing that the
prosecutor filed the charges only one day before the statutory deadline).
327. In other words, a suspect may invoke the speedy trial guarantee only after he
has been accused. In many instances, prosecutors have filed DNA indictments
immediately prior to the expiration of the relevant statute of limitations. See supra
note 326. It is patently unreasonable to expect defendants—and even defense
counsel who have not had the opportunity to research the issue—to be so aware of
the length of the relevant limitations period and the current status of the Supreme
Court’s conflicting Sixth Amendment doctrine. See supra note 275 (outlining the
Court’s inconsistencies in Speedy Trial analysis), as to allow them to invoke their
Sixth Amendment rights during the few hours after arrest when the statute of
limitations remains applicable.
328. Whether a defendant may invoke his constitutional Speedy Trial guarantee
depends on how quickly police arrest him after filing the DNA indictment. Suspects
who have unwittingly been indicted by virtue of their DNA theoretically may remain
at large for many years; they would have the stronger Sixth Amendment argument.
Contrast that scenario, however, with the case of Paul Robinson in California, who
probably could not seek protection under the Sixth Amendment because the period
between indictment and arrest was so brief. See Kravets, supra note 6 (indicating that
police arrested Robinson only a few weeks after the DNA indictment). In this case,
prosecutors left Robinson without recourse to either the statute of limitations or the
Speedy Trial guarantee, despite the fact that more than five years had passed since
the crime that police allege he committed. See id. (noting that the suspect’s identity
had baffled the prosecutors for five years).
329. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31 (suggesting courts need to draw fact-specific
conclusions based on the “peculiar circumstances” of each case to decide whether
the length of the delay triggers further Sixth Amendment analysis).
330. See id. at 531 (“To take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated for
an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy
charge.”).
331. See id. at 533 (recognizing the Barker test is a “difficult and sensitive balancing
process”); Wernikoff, supra note 301, at 832-33 (arguing that the subjective aspects of
Barker’s balancing test inherently require courts to substitute their own values for
objective ones in assessing the validity of a prosecution).
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remain mindful of Barker’s emphasis on the complexity of the crime
itself as opposed to the severity of its results in order to avoid
332
trampling DNA indictees’ constitutional rights.
b.

Cause of the delay

In the speedy trial cases the Court has adjudicated under a Barker
analysis, it has concentrated on issues such as the government’s
333
and the defendant’s stall
intentional or negligent “lethargy”
334
tactics. Prosecutors’ injection of genetic evidence into this analysis,
through DNA indictments, presents entirely new issues the Court has
not yet addressed. For example, has the government satisfied its
335
burden of diligence simply by entering a DNA sample from an
unknown source, collected from the scene of an alleged crime, into a
databank? An extrapolation of Doggett implies the government’s
336
burden reaches further than simply entering data into a databank,
although Doggett remains distinguishable on the grounds the police in
337
that case knew the defendant’s identity.
On the other hand, the government has very limited options in
searching for a suspect they do not know by name or physical
332. See, e.g., United States v. Vassell, 970 F.2d 1162, 1164 (2d Cir. 1992) (focusing
on the difficulty in gathering and interpreting evidence rather than the harm
inflicted on the victims).
333. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 656, 657 (1992) (affirming
Barker’s emphasis on weighing “official bad faith” against the government, and
concluding that the governmental delay in the instant case reflected “egregious
persistence in failing to prosecute” the defendant) (emphasis added); Barker, 407
U.S. at 531 (“A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense
should be weighted heavily against the government.”). But see United States v.
Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 796 (1977) (finding that the delay caused by prosecutors’
further investigation into the case constituted a good-faith attempt to marshal the
facts of the case and thus did not prejudice the defendant).
334. See United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 314 (1986) (explaining that
the delay should be weighed against the defendant because he filed “indisputably
frivolous petitions”); United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 11 (1982) (finding that
the defendant caused the delay in the case through his “legal maneuvers”).
335. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656 (concluding that the defendant would have been
unable to present a viable speedy trial claim if the government “had pursued Doggett
with reasonable diligence from his indictment to his arrest”); Wernikoff, supra note
301, at 829 (interpreting the Court’s Doggett decision to place on the government “a
constitutional duty to make a diligent good-faith effort to bring indicted defendants
to trial without unnecessary delay”).
336. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, 649 (concluding that the Government made “no
serious effort” to find the defendant, despite the fact that an investigator had entered
Doggett’s name into the Treasury Enforcement Communication System database
and had notified other agencies of the outstanding warrant); Wernikoff, supra note
301, at 831 (“[C]ourts should require the prosecution to diligently seek defendants
under protections granted by the Sixth Amendment.”).
337. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 650 (relating the fact that the Marshal’s Service
verified the defendant’s residence and work address “within minutes” after running a
credit check).
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338

description. In fact, by analogy the Court might sympathize with a
339
governmental delay caused by difficulty identifying the suspect. The
government might further strengthen its position by likening an
investigation premised on a DNA indictment to other types of
340
complex prosecutions that require additional time to investigate.
DNA indictments raise the additional question of whether courts
should tip the balance against the government for the delay in
341
In such a
entering a defendant’s DNA sample into a database.
scenario, the delay could have resulted from a lack of available
342
resources or prosecutors’ failure to recognize the usefulness of
343
DNA evidence.
Courts may properly deem this delay official
344
negligence, especially with respect to prosecutors’ failure to realize
338. See id. at 656 (finding it inappropriate to weigh the length-of-delay factor
against the government when the government must track down a defendant who
goes into hiding); Wernikoff, supra note 301, at 830 (recognizing that the courts do
not require “heroic efforts” by law enforcement officials pursuing a suspect who
avoids identification and capture).
339. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 796 (1977) (declaring the
government did not violate fundamental rules of fairness by delaying a suspect’s trial
while continuing its investigation to identify potential co-defendants); see also Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972) (noting that tracking down a missing witness is a
“valid reason” to “justify appropriate delay”). See generally Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656
(“Our speedy trial standards recognize that pretrial delay is often both inevitable and
wholly justifiable.”).
340. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31 (offering a complex conspiracy charge as the
type of case justifying longer periods of investigation, and concluding that “the
length of delay that will provoke [a Barker] inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the
peculiar circumstances of the case”).
341. See DNA Labs Hired to Clear 12,000 NYC Rape Cases, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Sept. 28,
2000, at A8 (reporting that New York City alone has a backlog of 16,000 rape kits that
have not been analyzed); Kozlowski, supra note 201, at 1E (identifying Michigan’s
backlog of samples from sex offenders dating back to 1991, awaiting entry into the
state and federal DNA databanks, at 15,000); State Could Solve More Rapes With Funds
for DNA, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, June 13, 2000, at A8 [hereinafter Funds for DNA]
(noting that two-thirds of the states struggle with tremendous backlogs of DNA
samples from sexual assault and violent crimes); Robert Tanner, DNA Puts Statutes of
Limitations on Trial, PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy, MA), Mar. 18, 2000, at 4 (counting
180,000 untested rape kits nationwide); cf. supra Part III.B (discussing the differences
between fingerprints and DNA samples in the cost and effort required to compile the
relevant databases).
342. See City Moves to Clear Unsolved Rapes, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 28, 2000, at 7 (discussing
New York City’s appropriation of $12 million to reduce the backlog of 16,000
untested rape kits); Man Could Be First Arrested with DNA Warrant, AP NEWSWIRES, Oct.
24, 2000 (discussing how a $50 million grant from the California Office of Criminal
Justice Planning will help reduce the backlog of cases and allow for more DNA
indictments).
343. See Slevin, supra note 125, at A3 (repeating the words of a Brooklyn Assistant
District Attorney, saying, “[v]ery few people either take advantage of [the benefits of
DNA evidence] or know about it. We’re so swamped with crime, assistant DAs come
through and they don’t have DNA training”).
344. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656 (delineating the different levels of delay that
courts may assign to the government, and noting that between diligent prosecution
and bad faith delay lies “official negligence”).
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the importance of DNA evidence. Dicta from the Barker opinion
345
suggests courts should attribute such delay to the government but
346
should not weigh it as heavily as deliberate governmental bad-faith.
In making their assessments, however, courts should not overlook
347
348
prosecutors’ professional responsibilities in seeking indictments.
If prosecutors begin indicting DNA to circumvent the statute of
349
limitations for every rape case, for example, they significantly
increase the risk of running afoul of professional standards of
350
conduct.
If the courts uphold DNA-based warrants and
indictments, prosecutors can and should seek to preserve defendants’
constitutional rights by employing these tools based on reasoned
351
352
judgment rather than mere opportunity.
345. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 (“A . . . neutral reason such as negligence . . .
should be weighted less heavily but nonetheless be considered since the ultimate
responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than the
defendant.”).
346. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657 (asserting that courts must consider a delay due to
official negligence, even if lacking in bad faith, but contending that courts
accordingly should not weigh negligent delay as heavily as official bad-faith delay).
347. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(a) (2001) (“The
prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . refrain from prosecuting a charge that the
prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause.”).
348. See Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 733 (1999) (emphasizing that prosecutors face an ethical
dilemma between acting as zealous advocates for the sovereign and responsibility to
“a broader duty to ensure justice”).
349. See Latour, supra note 45, at B1 (“In New York, police have begun a massive
effort to reopen 12,000 unsolved rapes” based on DNA testing and indictments).
350. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 791 (1977) (“[I]ndeed it is
unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to recommend an indictment on less than
probable cause. It should be equally obvious that prosecutors are under no duty to
file charges as soon as probable cause exists but before they are satisfied they will be able to
establish the suspect’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).
351. See Henning, supra note 348, at 715-16 (“[T]he Fifth and Sixth Amendments,
which largely govern the manner in which the prosecutor conducts a criminal
proceeding, do not require an assessment of the reasonableness of the government’s
actions, as does the Fourth Amendment’s proscription on ‘unreasonable searches
and seizures.’”) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV). In deciding whether to indict
genetic material from a rape crime scene, prosecutors should consider the existence
and reliability of corroborating evidence such as eyewitness identification of the
alleged perpetrator, physical evidence left at the scene that could link the
perpetrator to the crime at a much later date in the future, the possibility the genetic
material derived from a source other than the suspect (i.e., especially when the DNA
tested is from hair or blood samples, as opposed to semen samples), the possibility of
contamination of the sample’s genetic material, the precedent-setting implications
for the current and future defendants, and the ability and resources available to
exclude other possible sources of the DNA sample who have similar genetic
structures. See Slater, supra note 314, at A1 (reiterating questions prosecutors should
ask when deciding whether to seek a DNA indictment, including, “Could the victim
be located to testify if a DNA match was found? Was there any chance the suspect
could claim the encounter was consensual? How vicious was the attack?”).
352. See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 862 (1995)

BERNASCONIPP

1032
c.

10/18/01 4:45 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:979

Defendant’s vigilance in asserting speedy trial rights

In Doggett, the Supreme Court found that the defendant’s vigilance
in asserting speedy trial rights should not weigh against a defendant
353
who is unaware of an indictment pending against him. In the case
of a DNA indictment, the defendant presumably would not know he
had been indicted even if the indictment described the genetic
354
markers within the DNA. Absent a showing by the government that
355
the defendant knew about the indictment, this consideration will be
a non-factor in a Barker analysis of a DNA indictment case.
The discussion above focuses on three factors that individually
356
retain importance in assessing a defendant’s right to a speedy trial.
As alluded to in each instance, however, the main thrust of this
analysis depends on the lynchpin of the Speedy Trial Clause: the
potential prejudice accruing to an accused defending via an old
357
claim.
d.

Prejudice to the defendant

The Barker Court identified three interests that lower courts should
consider when weighing the prejudice suffered by defendants as a
358
result of the delay: (1) oppressive pre-trial detention; (2) public
359
obloquy; and (3) impairment of the defendant’s ability to defend
(implying prosecutors possess the ability to charge defendants in almost any
conceivable manner because “[t]he prosecutor’s charging discretion is, for the most
part, unreviewable”).
353. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 653-54 (insisting that this factor would have weighed
heavily against the defendant if the Government had proved he knew of the
indictment and still failed to assert his right). The Court ultimately deferred to the
issuing magistrate’s conclusion that the defendant left the country before police
indicted him and therefore did not know about the indictment. See id. By devoting
almost a full page to settling a controversy over the factual status of the case and only
two sentences to an analysis of whether this factor could weigh against an unaware
defendant, the Court suggested the absurdity of weighing this factor against a
defendant unaware of the pending indictment. See id.
354. See Willing, supra note 4, at 1A (casting doubt on the theory that people
could recognize their DNA profile by citing the comments of a law professor with
extensive DNA experience, remarking, “[p]eople know their own name, even their
own nickname or alias, but do they know their own (DNA) profile?”) (parenthesis in
original).
355. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 653 (lambasting the government for arguing that the
defendant knew of the indictment after the government failed to challenge
testimony to the contrary at a hearing on the speedy trial motion).
356. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972) (“[N]one of the four factors . . .
[is] either a necessary or sufficient condition . . . [T]hey are related factors and must
be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.”).
357. See United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966) (announcing prejudice to
a defendant’s case takes precedence over any other factors or considerations)
(quoting Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 10 (1959)).
358. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 (listing the factors).
359. See id.
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360

himself.
Recognizing the Supreme Court has not been consistent
361
in analyzing the prejudice factor, the following section attempts to
predict the impact of DNA indictments on these considerations. It
concludes that this Barker factor should favor the defendant because
DNA indictments inherently prejudice indictees’ abilities to raise
defenses.
i.

Pretrial detention

In applying the pretrial detention factor, the Court’s main
362
By
concerns address restrictions on defendants’ liberty.
363
definition,
DNA indictees do not face the consequences
contemplated by pretrial detention and therefore render it a nonissue in speedy trial analysis of DNA indictments.
ii. Public obloquy
The Court has also expressed a concern over the social
364
consequences a suspect faces upon public accusation of a crime. As
with the pre-trial detention issue, a DNA indictee’s nominal
365
anonymity shields him from public obloquy and similarly renders it
moot.
iii. Impairment of defense
Because the Court has not applied the impairment of defenses
factor consistently, the following analysis relies on the Court’s most
366
The majority suggested
recent articulation of the issue in Doggett.
that courts have a duty to consider all factors resulting from a post367
accusation delay affecting an accused’s defense.
360. See id.
361. See supra Part IV.C (revealing the Court’s “ping-pong” approach in deciding
how much emphasis to afford this factor).
362. See Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 312 (“[T]he Speedy Trial Clause’s core concern is
impairment of liberty.”).
363. See Dedman, supra note 5, at A8 (indicating “John Doe” indictments, the
device through which grand juries file DNA indictments, describe a person whose
identity is otherwise unknown to law enforcement officers or the public at large).
364. See Marion, 404 U.S. at 320 (“Arrest is a public act that may . . . disrupt his
employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to
public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends.”).
365. See Charges, supra note 5 (indicating grand juries issue “John Doe”
indictments for DNA indictees because the indictee’s name remains unknown).
366. See supra note 275 (tracing the court’s internal conflict in analyzing the issue
of prejudice to an accused’s defense). Given the Court’s inconsistent and relatively
infrequent application of this factor, the most recent articulation provides the most
relevant guide for extrapolating its logic to the current, novel situation.
367. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655 (“Once triggered by arrest, indictment, or other
official accusation . . . the speedy trial enquiry must weigh the effect of the delay on
the accused’s defense just as it has to weigh any other form of prejudice that Barker

BERNASCONIPP

1034

10/18/01 4:45 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:979

In Doggett, the Court unwittingly bolstered the argument of future
defendants challenging DNA indictments by declaring that
defendants need not prove actual prejudice to assert impairment of
368
defense. If the government fails to justify its delay in bringing the
369
prosecution, courts should automatically weigh this failure in the
370
defendant’s favor.
The impairment of defenses factor will prove
especially helpful to defendants whose alleged crimes occurred long
371
372
ago and who no longer may assert a statute of limitations defense.
Furthermore, if the courts find the government’s failure to enter a
defendant’s DNA sample into the relevant database to constitute
373
official negligence, the delay constitutes presumptive prejudice and
374
this factor should favor the defendant.
In examining the possible prejudice to a DNA indictee’s defense,
courts should also consider the unique implications of the use of
375
DNA evidence.
In addition to facing the presumptive prejudice
376
caused by a lapse of time long enough to trigger a Barker analysis,

recognized.”).
368. See id. (acknowledging the virtual impossibility of proving the actual degree
of harm a defendant’s case suffers through lost evidence and fading memories
caused by the passage of time). This declaration by the Court clarified the issue for
lower courts, which prior to Doggett had required a showing of prejudice before
entertaining a Speedy Trial Clause claim. See Wernikoff, supra note 301, at 823-24 &
n.156 (collecting cases).
369. For a more detailed discussion of questions raised by DNA indictments in
assigning blame for the cause of delay, see supra Part IV.C.
370. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655 (“Thus, we generally have to recognize that
excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither
party can prove or, for that matter, identify.”) (emphasis added).
371. See id. at 656 (instructing courts to tip the balance of the prejudice factor in
favor of defendants in such a manner that “its importance increases with the length
of delay”).
372. See supra note 328 (discussing the means through which prosecutors have
used DNA indictments to preclude defendants the opportunity of presenting a
statutory defense).
373. See supra Part IV.D.1.b (discussing the possibility that courts will attribute the
cause of delay factor to the government for its failure to enter a genetic sample into
the relevant DNA database).
374. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 (holding that courts should assess “neutral
reason[s]” constituting official government negligence against the government,
albeit less heavily than intentional delays); United States v. Aguirre, 994 F.3d 1454,
1456 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Where the government is negligent in pursuing a defendant,
prejudice will be presumed and its weight in defendant’s favor will depend on the
length of the delay.”); United States v. Shell, 974 F.2d 1035, 1036 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that the government’s negligence created a “strong” presumption of
prejudice against the accused’s defense after the prosecutors lost his file and only
arrested the defendant after finding the file five years later).
375. For a general discussion of the inherent problems faced by suspects
attempting to rebut DNA evidence, as opposed to the more scientifically accurate
fingerprint evidence, see supra Part III.B.
376. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 & n.1 (establishing a duration of one year between
indictment and arrest as presumptively prejudicial).
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DNA indictees must also address prejudice caused by use of DNA
evidence that manifests in factors such as: jurors’ overemphasis on
377
statistical probabilities explaining the relevance of DNA evidence;
378
misperceptions surrounding the accuracy of DNA evidence;
misleading explanations of DNA evidence to jurors by prosecutors
379
and their witnesses; the potential for jurors to assign undue weight
to DNA evidence because of the inconsistency with which
380
investigators collect it; and the scientific community’s lack of
381
consensus in interpreting DNA evidence.
The foregoing list does
not suggest the government necessarily causes these unique
problems, but instead illustrates the significant hurdles an accused
faces in defending against the implications raised by DNA evidence.
The prejudice a defendant faces as a result of the cumulative effect of
382
these factors on a jury is substantial. When assessed in combination
with the presumptive prejudice caused by the passage of time, these
DNA-related issues warrant special consideration in favor of
defendants by courts determining the possibility that an accused’s
case has been impaired.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The advent of DNA evidence presents exciting new possibilities,
and prosecutors recently have exploited its potential through the
novel practice of indicting genetic material. Though the virtues of
this practice have been extolled in the media, a deeper analysis
reveals the adverse implications for criminal defendants’ statutory
and constitutional rights.
First, by directly undermining the rationale giving rise to statutes of
limitations, DNA indictments flagrantly disregard the historical
383
384
development as well as the legislative and judicial preference for
377. See Koehler supra note 179, at 212 (revealing that jurors significantly
“overweight” random match probabilities).
378. See NRC I, supra note 45, at 161 (clarifying the superiority in accuracy of
fingerprint evidence, relative to DNA evidence); see also id. at 157 (indicating the
inability of DNA evidence to distinguish between the identity of twins).
379. See Lempert, supra note 134, at 441-42 (describing prosecutors’
misrepresentations regarding the accuracy of DNA evidence).
380. See NRC I, supra note 45, at 112 (noting investigators cannot afford to collect
DNA evidence with the frequency they collect fingerprints, leading to the implication
the prosecution warrants higher priority than an ordinary street crime).
381. See Lempert, supra note 134, at 444 (suggesting that some experts overstate
the reliability of the evidence).
382. See Commonwealth v. Curnin, 565 N.E.2d 440, 441 (Mass. 1991) (indicating
the statistical random match probabilities alone have a prejudicial impact on a jury).
383. See Adelstein, supra note 67, at 249-50 (inferring a legislative preference for
statutes of limitations).
384. See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) (enunciating the judicial
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limiting actions. Additionally, while forensic scientists have proven
DNA to be extremely useful in identifying criminal suspects, genetic
evidence does not yet deserve the accolades that dermatoglyphic
385
fingerprint evidence has garnered.
These conclusions compel several recommendations.
First,
legislatures should re-assess their respective statutory regimes to
determine whether their current limiting actions warrant
modification in light of the scientific advances that give effect to DNA
indictments. The development of public policy lies within the
primary domain of legislatures and they are uniquely positioned to
386
accomplish this task. This solution offers the additional benefit of
preserving defendants’ statutory rights rather than forcing them to
seek adjudication in courts of law.
Second, where possible, prosecutors should rely on fingerprint
evidence to a greater extent than DNA evidence. By doing so, they
would increase the probability of drawing a definitive conclusion as to
identity and simultaneously avoid the unique problems and the
possible prejudice to defendants that is associated with DNA
evidence.
Third, in the event courts uphold the validity of DNA indictments,
prosecutors should exercise restraint in using them, similar to the
restraint they have shown in using fingerprint evidence. This
recommendation does not imply prosecutors should never use DNA
indictments; indeed, there may be instances when they are especially
387
appropriate. However, their use should be limited to circumstances
when, as with fingerprints, the available evidence indicates significant
corroborating evidence and a substantial likelihood that: a crime
occurred, the genetic sample derived from the DNA indictee, and the
DNA sample did not arrive at the crime scene inadvertently or
388
innocently.
preference for statutes of limitations).
385. See NRC I, supra note 45, at 161 (establishing fingerprints as more reliable
than DNA evidence).
386. See Baughman, supra note 92, at 1117 (suggesting legislatures possess the
responsibility to make public policy decisions).
387. See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 134, at 461-62 (describing a hypothetical
scenario in which a crime is committed at an Arctic air base). In Lempert’s
hypothetical situation, the base consists of approximately 100,000 people, virtually all
of whom have provided samples for a DNA database. In that instance, a 1:100,000
probability of a random match would be far superior even to a staggering number
like 1:1 million in the civilian world. See id.
DNA indictments may also be appropriate when the DNA sample is collected from
a rape kit, following allegations of a sexual assault for which consent cannot be
contested. See supra Part II.D (discussing the probative value of genetic samples
collected during a post-rape hospital examination).
388. See, e.g., People v. Summers, 426 N.E.2d 937, 940 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (finding
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Finally, in analyzing a DNA indictee’s inevitable invocation of their
speedy trial guarantee, courts should carefully scrutinize the potential
prejudice to the indictee’s defense caused by the passage of time by
considering the possibility that prosecutors precluded invocation of
389
his statutory rights.
Moreover, courts should grant special
consideration to the unique sources of potential prejudice to
390
defendants occasioned by DNA evidence. In performing their Sixth
Amendment analysis, courts should bear in mind not only the
retrospective difficulties caused by the passage of time, but also the
futuristic hurdles a DNA indictee faces in attempting to exonerate
himself.
These recommendations attempt to provide safeguards against the
most egregious sources of prejudice facing DNA indictees. They
provide a preliminary step toward the preservation of criminal
defendants’ rights as well as the integrity and that public trust in the
391
criminal justice system.

probable cause existed to link a defendant to a crime scene when the evidence
revealed the fingerprints could only have been impressed at the time the crime was
committed).
389. See supra note 328 (explaining how prosecutors’ manipulation of the DNA
indictment process potentially prevents indictees from asserting a statute of
limitations claim, depending on when prosecutors sought the DNA indictment).
390. See supra Part IV.D.1.d.iii (listing the problems raised specifically by DNA
evidence).
391. See Conforti, supra note 243, at 635 (implying both defendants and society as
a whole will benefit from the diligent prosecution and resolution of crimes).

